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Case No. 20110136 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NERIM JELASHOVIC, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner is appealing the denial of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. Appeal is permitted under U.C.A. 
§78B-9-110 and jurisdiction appropriate under §78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE # 1; Did the Trial Court err when it held that VanCampen did not 
perform deficiently by providing incorrect immigration advice? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We defer to [the lower courtfs] factual 
findings, but determine as a matter of law whether the defendant received 
1 
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ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment." State v. 
Maestas, 997 P.2d 314,318 (Utah App. 2000) 
ISSUE # 2: Did the Trial Court err when it held that Mr. Jelashovic did not 
satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis? ' 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We review an appeal from an order 
dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without
 ( 
deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, f 
13, 156 P.3d 739 (quoting Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, \ 7, 94 P.3d 263). 
ISSUE # 3: Did the Trial Court err when it failed to make a finding 
concerning the date at which Mr. Jelashovic discovered the incorrect advice of his 
< 
attorney, Mr. VanCampen? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of Discretion. SeeAllredv. Allred, 797 
P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App.1990) (failure to enter detailed findings concerning < 
child support determination constitutes abuse of trial court's discretion). 
i 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
Issues # 1 - 3 were originally raised by Petitioner's Petition for Relief Under 
I 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("Petition") and the Memorandum in support 
thereof. (R. 1-99). An order denying the non-immigration specific aspects of the 
2 
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Petition was entered on 13 September, 2010 (R. 255-259). An order denying the 
remainder of the Petition was entered on 24 January, 2011 (R.295-311). 
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal was subsequently filed on 9 February, 2011 (R. 313-
314). Issue # 3 first arose upon the District Court entering its findings as part of its 
final order and as such is first raised on appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following determinative provisions are attached as Addendum A: 
INA§ 101;8U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1) 
INA § 201(b); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b) 
INA§ 212(a) 
INA § 236(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1226 
INA § 237(a), 8 USC § 1227 
INA § 239(a); 8 U.S.C. §1229(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14, 1239.1(a), 1240.30, 
1240.55 
INA § 240(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(2); and 8 C.F.R.§ 1240.8(b) 
INA § 240(A) 
U.C.A. §78A-4-103 
U.C.A. §78B-9-101 
U.C.A. §78B-9-110 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. _ , 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010) 
State's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying the Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief 
Order on the State's Motion to Dismiss 
1-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal 
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an Appeal taken after the denial of Nerim Jelashovic's Petition 
for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Section 78B-9-
101, et seq. The Petitioner was originally charged with two first degree felony 
counts of Aggravated Sexual Assault stemming from an incident that occurred in 
December of 2002. At the time of the alleged offense, he was 17 years old, and 
charges were filed shortly after his 18th birthday in the Third District Court of Utah. < 
Petitioner's father retained an inexperienced attorney, D. Christopher VanCampen, 
to represent his son. Eventually, Mr. VanCampen convinced his client that he 
should accept the plea offered by the state of two second degree felonies with a no 
prison recommendation. Petitioner was sentenced for the two second degree 
felony counts of forcible sexual abuse. 
In August of 2009, Petitioner was given documents in anticipation of being 
released on parole. At that time, he was informed by a counselor that an 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") hold had been placed on him and 
he should expect to hear from agents about his deportation to his nation of origin, < 
Bosnia. On October 15, 2009, agents from ICE came and saw Petitioner for the 
first time. ^ 
4 
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Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act ("PCRA") on March 8, 2010. (R. 1-14). In his Petition, Jelashovic alleged 
three grounds for relief: That his plea was unlawfully induced, that his counsel was 
ineffective, and that his confession was coerced. In response, the State filed a 
Motion to Dismiss on June 23, 2010, alleging the PCRA statute of limitations had 
run. (R. 120-205). An evidentiary hearing was held on August 25, 2010 on the 
State's Motion to Dismiss. At that hearing, the trial court ruled that the Petitioner's 
first and third claims were indeed time-barred, but the State's motion as to the 
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon faulty advice regarding 
immigration consequences was denied and the Petition allowed to proceed. (R. 
255-258). 
Another evidentiary hearing was held on October 7, 2010. After that hearing 
the parties supplied supplemental briefing and provided proposed orders and 
findings of fact to the court. The court adopted the State's Proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law without comment or edit on January 24, 2011, 
denying Petitioner's final ground for relief. (R. 295-310). This appeal followed. 
5 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 8, 2002, Nerim Jelashovic hosted a party attended by, among 
others, a female identified in reports only as N.B. (R. 166). At some point during 
the evening, N.B. accompanied Mr. Jelashovic to his bedroom where they began to 
kiss and eventually they had intercourse (R. 167). Pursuant to a subsequent 
investigation, Mr. Jelashovic was charged with two counts of Aggravated Sexual 
Assault, 1st degree felonies on January 3, 2003 (R. 166). At the time of filing, Mr. 
Jelashovic was 18 years old and had lived in the United States for only five (5) 
years, having come to this country as a refugee from Bosnia in 1997 R. 
273 [20:24]). 
Mr. Jelashovic's father hired an attorney for Mr. Jelashovic by the name of 
D. Christopher VanCampen (Bar# 8626) . Mr. VanCampen prepared his 
appearance of counsel on January 7, 2003 (R. 21). He also filed at that time an ( 
Entry of Plea (R. 24) and a Demand for Jury Trial (R. 26), two pleadings which are 
superfluous in a felony criminal case.
 ( 
On the date set for preliminary hearing, March 13, 2003, Mr. VanCampen 
instructed his client to waive his right for a preliminary hearing despite the fact that 
the victim was extremely reluctant to testify (R. 35: 16-18). 
Throughout the pendancy of the case, even after entering his plea, Mr. 
< 
6 
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Jelashovic demonstrated his belief that the sexual contact he had with N.B. was 
consensual, a fact used by the court as a basis for giving him the maximum 
sanction available: two concurrent 1-15 year terms at the Utah State Prison (R. 
51:11 -20). Mr. VanCampen attempted to forge a guilty plea on May 9, 2003. 
During the Rule 11 plea colloquy, Judge Timothy Hanson asked Mr. Jelashovic to 
describe what had happened (R. 64:10). At this point, Mr. Jelashovic was confused 
about whether he should recount the facts his attorney told him to state or to 
actually tell the court what he recalled happening. Id. 10:14-19. At this point Mr. 
Jelashovic recounted his belief that the encounter was consensual and the court, 
upon hearing this stated that it could not accept a guilty plea. Id. 10:22-12:4. At 
this point, the unusual situation of defense counsel arguing for guilt with the court 
and even the prosecutor pointing out that Mr. Jelashovic had a legitimate defense 
occurred. Id. 12:5-16:4. In the end, the court would not take a plea and set the 
matter for trial. 
Subsequent to this hearing, Mr. VanCampen convinced Mr. Jelashovic and 
his family that Mr. Jelashovic needed to plea guilty and that next time he needed to 
say it the right way. On July 18, 2003, Mr. Jelashovic entered a guilty plea to the 
amended information (R. 89:13-25). After performing a diagnostic at the State 
Prison, Mr. Jelashovic was sentenced on February 6, 2004. Critically, at that 
7 
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hearing, Mr. VanCampen stated to the court that he had discussed the immigration 
consequences of the plea, and told him that "as long as he performs well on 
probation and doesn't get into further trouble, that at this point, he's not going to be 
deported" (R. 46:17-21). 
After Sentencing, Mr. Jelashovic began serving his term of incarceration at 
the Utah State Penitentiary (R. 273 [19:8]). While at the prison, he was allowed to 
complete sex offender treatment, and did work and college classes, all things that 
prisoners with INS holds are not allowed to do. (Id. at 21:6-23:16). In August 
2009, Mr. Jelashovic received notice that he was to be sent to Bosnia upon 
receiving probation. (Id. at 23:18-25:19). Finally, in October 2009 he was visited 
by ICE agents and officially informed of this fact. (Id. at 26:20-28:10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner, Nerim Jelashovic argues that when his original attorney, David < 
VanCampen stated in response to an inquiry from the bench about immigration 
status that, "I've discussed that with him and Ifm told that he's discussed that with -
yeah, and that as long as he performs well on probation and doesn't get into further 
trouble, that at this point, he's not going to be deported" (R. 46:17-21), he gave a 
quintessential example of incorrect advice. How wrong this advice was, was not 
discovered until several years later when Mr. Jelashovic was informed that upon 
i 
8 
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parole that he would be going immediately into deportation proceedings. 
Within a year of finding out about his pending deportation, Petitioner filed a 
Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). At a hearing 
ostensibly to determine when it was that the statute of limitations started running 
on his claims, Petitioner introduced evidence that he was unaware of any 
immigration detainer until he was about to be paroled in August of 2009. This 
evidence was not discredited in any way. 
Because Petitioner received faulty advice and filed a timely Petition for 
Relief, the District Court erred in denying his petition. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Pursuant to Kentucky v. Padilla, VanCampen Gave Constitutionally 
Deficient Advice to Mr. Jelashovic. 
The trial court erred when it held that "Mr. VanCampen?s advice about the 
immigration consequences of the plea was [not] incorrect or otherwise objectively 
unreasonable" (R. 308). Traditionally, courts have used the two-pronged 
Strickland v. Washington standard to determine whether or not counsel was 
constitutionally deficient. First, the movant must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Second, it must be shown that 
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had it not been for the 
9 
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deficiency. Id. This test was broadened to cover matters of immigration when the 
United States Supreme Court issued the decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 
, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010). At the very least, Padilla is properly viewed as a 
modification of the first prong of the Strickland test. Specifically, Padilla held that 
proper advice on immigration consequences is part of what is reasonably expected 
from criminal counsel. In sum, the failure of a criminal defense attorney to advise 
a non-citizen about the immigration consequences of a plea falls below the 
constitutional threshold. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Padilla, the rule in Utah was stated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Roj as-Martinez, 2005 UT 86, 125 
P.3d, 930, which held that it was ineffective assistance for counsel to "affirmatively 
misrepresent the deportation consequences of a guilty plea." Id. at f20. 
Petitioner's original memorandum cited this authority, and Mr. VanCampenfs < 
advice clearly fails that test, but with the issuance of the Padilla decision, the 
analysis of this case shifted to incorporate that newly-announced method of dealing 
with the intersection of criminal and immigration law. 
A, Because the Immigration Consequences of Mr. Jelashovic?s Plea 
Were Clear, Mr. VanCampen Had a Duty to Provide Clear and < 
Accurate Advice. 
Under Padilla, when the immigration consequences of a plea are "clear", 
i 
10 
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then the advice given regarding those consequences must be "equally clear". 
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. The simplest determination to make is perhaps whether 
a crime will trigger deportation proceedings. See generally INA 237, 8 USC § 
1227. Simply put, a non-citizen should know whether or not a plea will land the 
individual into deportation proceedings. However, the triggering of deportation 
proceedings is just the beginning of a lengthy legal process. The true immigration 
consequences of a plea come into play only after deportation proceedings have 
been initiated.1 Just as proper advice for a criminal defendant in a murder case 
would undoubtedly include discussions about potential jail time, the possibility of 
parole, probation, and the death penalty, any meaningful advice given to a non-
citizen concerning a plea whose collateral immigration consequences are "clear" 
requires discussion that goes far beyond the simple fact that a plea will "trigger 
deportation". 
1. Because Jelashovic Pled to a Crime that Prevents Him from 
Stopping Deportation, His Attorney Should Have Counseled 
Him Accordingly, 
As noted in Padilla, the vast majority of convictions will land a non-citizen 
1 Deportation begins with issuance of a Notice to Appear (Form 1-862) in which the alien is summoned to appear 
in front of an immigration judge at a specified time and place to begin the process. See INA §239(a); 8 U.S.C. 
§1229(a); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14, 1239.1(a), 1240.30, 1240.55. DHS initially has a low burden of proving alienage 
which can be met through hearsay on form 1-213 as federal rules of evidence are not applicable in immigration 
court. See e.g., Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 729 n.2 vehear'g denied256 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2001) 
Burden then shifts to the non-citizen to show s/he is "clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is not 
inadmissible under the section pursuant to federal law. See INA §240(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(2); and 8 
C.F.R.§ 1240.8(b) 
11 
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into deportation proceedings. Padilla 130 S.Ct at 1476. However, once 
deportability is established, the most import question is whether there is any way 
for the non-citizen to fight deportation and stay in the country. 
A non-citizen may stop deportation by finding a "form of relief' from 
deportation. See generally INA §§240A(a)&(b); Kurzban's Immigration Law 
Sourcebook 163 (11th ed. 2008). There is little doubt that Padilla brings advice 
regarding the eligibility for relief into the spectrum of consequences that a criminal 
defense attorney must discuss. Padilla specifically states that "preserving the 
possibility of relief' is one of the principal benefits sought by defendants looking 
to negotiate a plea agreement. Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1483; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
In this case, Petitioner, Nerim Jelashovic, was instructed by his counsel to 
plea to two counts of forcible sexual abuse, 2nd degree felonies. This charge makes ( 
the likelihood of Jelashovic obtaining any relief from deportation extremely slim2. 
Competent counsel would have informed him of this, instead of stating, as
 { 
VanCampen did that, "as long as he performs well on probation and doesn't get into 
further trouble, that at this point, hefs not going to be deported." R. 46:17-21. 
2 INA §237 (a) states that "Any alien ... shall... be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following 
classes of deportable aliens" (emphasis added). Petitioner qualifies under at least subsections (2)(A)(i), (2)(A) 
(ii) and (2)(A)(iii) because of the plea he entered. 
12 
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2. Because Petitioner's Plea Subjected Him to Mandatory 
Detention, His Attorney Should have Advised Him Accordingly. 
Padilla notes the obvious truth that in the criminal context, the potential for 
jail time is an important aspect of a plea that every criminal defendant should be 
aware of. Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1483. The potential for jail time that a non-citizen 
faces at the hands of immigration officials is an equally important aspect of a plea 
which a defendant should understand. Particularly, a non-citizen should be advised 
if a conviction will subject him to what is known as "mandatory detention" at the 
hands of ICE without the possibility of bail. See INA §236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 
(aliens subject to mandatory detention for even relatively minor crimes for which 
they become ineligible for bail, referred to in immigration proceedings as "bond"). 
As a general principle, information about mandatory detention is crucial for 
a non-citizen because a non-citizen accepting a plea requiring only a weekend in 
jail might think he is getting a good deal until he finds out that instead of going 
home on Monday morning, ICE will lock him up without possibility of bond for 
months or even years before ultimately being deported. Because of the lengthy 
deportation process, detention considerations are every bit as crucial as jail 
sentences for the non-citizen defendant. 
Pursuant to INA §236, Petitioner is not eligible for bond, a fact that effective 
13 
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counsel would have advised him about. 
3, Because Petitioner's Plea Renders Him Inadmissible to the 
United States in the Future, His Attorney Should Have Advised 
Him Accordingly. 
Some crimes will not only get a non-citizen deported, but carry with them a 
life-time bar that banishes a person from ever coming back in to the United States. 
See e.g., Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1485; INA §212(a)(9)(A)(i) (regarding lifetime bar 
for aggravated felons); In immigration jargon, these are "inadmissibility" crimes 
and can render a non-citizen ineligible to ever return to the United States after 
being deported. Padilla notes that any "decent attorney" with knowledge that a 
client may face "banishment or exile" would surely inform the client of this risk. 
Padilla, 130 S.CT at 1484 n. 11. In embracing the prior Supreme Court holding of 
INSv. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294 (2001), the Padilla court specifically recognized 
the importance that a non-citizen be informed of whether or not the plea will < 
prevent him from being "admitted" into the country in the future, and not just 
whether the conviction will subject him to deportation. Padilla, S.Ct at 1482. 
In this case, Petitioner plead to a charge that carries with it a lifetime bar 
from reentry. INA §212(a)(9)(A)(i). He is also barred from ever returning because 
he plead to a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude ("CIMT"). INA §212(a)(2)(A)(i) 
(I). This is another fact competent counsel would have informed him of. 
14 
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The record is incomplete as to what exactly Petitioner's attorney informed 
Petitioner of as far as the immigration consequences of the negotiated plea deal. 
However some facts are clear: 1) At the February 6, 2004 sentencing hearing, Mr. 
VanCampen told court that he had discussed immigration consequences with his 
client and specifically informed him that he would not be deported (R. 46:17-21); 
2) at the time that he represented petitioner he did not have any particular expertise 
in the area of immigration law (R. 273, [56:1-3]); 3) Mr. VanCampen knew that his 
client was reliant upon him for knowledge of the law, both criminal and 
immigration (R. 273, [56:18-25]); 4) Mr. VanCampen mistakenly believed that the 
State of Utah had some input as to whether his client would get deported (R. 273 
[39:21-23]); 5) Mr. VanCampen testified that he spoke with "an ICE guy" and an 
in-court Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) officer about immigration 
consequences3 (R. 273 [40:21-41:9]); and 6) Mr. VanCampen correctly identified 
that length of incarceration can have some impact on immigration status (R, 273 
[45:20-24]), yet the deal he negotiated, for incarceration of one year on each of two 
counts, was too long to avoid the "aggravated felony" status that he thought he 
had, in fact, avoided. Thus, while Mr. VanCampen tried to downplay the level of 
his misadvice, the actual consequences of the plea were clear, and the advice that 
3 Why the "ICE guy" gave the wrong advice and why an AP&P officer would have anything at all to say about 
immigration consequences remains puzzling. If, in fact, any such conversation took place. 
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Mr. Jelashovic was entitled to receive from his attorney should have been equally 
clear as mandated by Padilla. Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1483. 
Thus, even without the record providing detail as to the depth of Mr. 
VanCampenfs knowledge of the intricacies of immigration law, it is certain that his 
understanding was limited and it is equally certain that he provided erroneous 
advice to his client when he advised him to accept the plea deal offered by the 
State. 
B. Because it Would Have Been Rational for Petitioner To Have 
Rejected the Plea Offer Had He Been Properly Advised, the Court 
Should have Granted His Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 
Under Padilla, the second prong of traditional Strickland analysis is satisfied 
when a petitioner shows that after being properly advised, choosing to reject a plea 
bargain would have been rational. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1483. Padilla 
downplays the nuances of this analysis, noting that lower courts have had plenty of < 
experience with this step of the Strickland analysis. Id. It would, however, be a 
mistake to approach this prong in the same manner as might be done with a citizen 
defendant. For example, a citizen might be foolish to reject a plea to a 
misdemeanor drug charge when the state's evidence is strong and there is little or 
( 
no risk for jail time. The choice to accept a fine or perhaps some drug treatment 
classes in order to avoid trial and jail time is a relatively easy decision for a citizen. 
16 
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For a non-citizen, however, the risk of a few weeks or even years in jail 
pales in comparison to the prospect of banishment to a third world country where 
he fears torture or death. See Padilla, 130 S.Ct at 1484. Some non-citizens would 
prefer a prison term in the United States where there is a roof overhead, three 
square meals a day, and weekly visits with loved ones. Others would prefer 
waiting things out in jail, hoping for a change in the law or personal circumstances 
that might benefit their situation4. 
Thus, when analyzing the prejudice prong, it is imperative that the Court 
take into account that the stakes simply are not as high for citizens as they are for 
non-citizens. For this reason, a seemingly 'irrational' decision by a citizen to take a 
weak case to trial might be the only "rational" decision when made by a non-
citizen facing the same charge. Non-citizens contemplating a trial and who fully 
understand the severe consequences of deportation have more to gain and almost 
nothing to lose by taking a gamble that a non-citizen would not even consider. 
At the October 7 hearing, the Respondent called Angela Miklos, who was 
the assigned prosecutrix for the underlying criminal case5. The attempt was to 
illicit testimony from Ms. Miklos about the strength of the State's case to 
demonstrate that it would be reasonable to accept the plea offer. Ms. Miklos 
4 See e.g., INA §§101(b)(l) & 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1) & 1151 (b)(2XA)(i) (providing that U.S. 
citizen children may petition for a parent upon turning 21. 
5 Ms. Miklos's testimony is found in R. 273 on pages 67-81 
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provided testimony that the complaining witness went to a party at the Petitioner's 
apartment attended by a handful of other individuals. She testified that the 
Petitioner, who was 17 years old at the time, had racy posters of women on his 
bedroom walls. She noted that the complaining witness never actually testified or 
was cross-examined in any way and in fact, would have had difficulty testifying. 
The complaining witness' story, as told to the police and then presented through the 
filter of Ms. Miklos, was that she voluntarily went to the Petitioner's bedroom 
where he raped her. According to Ms. Miklos, the Petitioner's story was much the 
same as the complaining witness except that his statement was that any sex was 
consensual. Ms. Miklos also testified that she couldn't remember details such as 
the approximate size or even the ethnicity of the complaining witness. At no time 
did Ms. Miklos give an estimation of the likely outcome should the case have gone 
to trial. ' 
For his part, Mr. VanCampen testified that he was not optimistic about the 
case at trial and was looking to negotiate a plea deal from early on. R. 273 [41:9-
 i 
13]. However, his estimation should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt. He had 
only been practicing for approximately four years. R. 273 [37:10]. Nothing in the 
record indicates that he interviewed any witnesses or conducted any independent 
investigation. Additionally, his lack of experience is clear through the fact that he 
18 
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filed inapplicable pleadings (R. 24 and 26), had never been in front of then-Judge 
Nehring (R. 31) and sought to "waive" his client's right to a full plea colloquy 
under Rule 11, so anxious was he to get his client to change his plea. R. 96:5-7. 
In reality, it is impossible to determine the likelihood of the outcome at trial 
because no evidence was ever tested by anyone. What is certain, however, is that 
the plea, as negotiated by Mr. VanCampen, even had the sentence been what he 
hoped, had dire and irreversible consequences for his client. As seen by his 1-589 
Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal6, Petitioner faces the 
potential of torture and death in his country of origin. In light of this, it is quite 
reasonable to propose that correct immigration advise would have changed 
Petitioner's willingness to accept the plea presented him as some jail, probation and 
smooth sailing for the future. 
Based upon this, it is clear that but for the faulty legal advice given him by 
Mr. VanCampen, Petitioner would not have changed his plea. 
C, Padilla Has Retroactive Applicability, 
Because Padilla announced a new rule for the conduct of criminal cases, it 
should be applied retroactively to Petitioner. Petitioner filed his original Petition 
on March 8, 2010, while the Supreme Court was deliberating Padilla. Once the 
6 The 1-589 is also used when petitioning under the Convention Against Torture, as Petitioner is doing in this 
instance, due to the fact that his plea in this case prevents him from obtaining asylum. 
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Padilla decision was issued, it immediately became part of the arguments used by 
both Petitioner and Respondent in this case. The United State Supreme Court has 
held that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied 
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review". Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), and Padilla has been held to apply 
retroactively by several courts, most recently in United States v. Bonilla, where the 
9th Circuit Court recognized the retroactivity of Padilla. Bonilla, 09-10307 (9th Cir. 
2011)7. While there is not, as of this writing any controlling Utah authority on the 
issue, the Petitioner urges the Court to follow the weight of the national precedent 
and explicitly apply the Padilla decision retroactively. 
II. The District Court Abused its Discretion in Failing to Make a Finding 
Pertaining to the Date When Petitioner Discovered his Counsel's 
Deficiency. 
Because the District Court mistakenly found that Mr. VanCampenfs advise 
was not faulty, it failed to make any findings of fact as to when the clock started 
ticking on the PCRA's one year statute of limitations. While it may be that this 
issue will be mooted by a finding of retro-activity for Padilla, should this Court 
7 Padilla has also been retroactively applied in other cases where convictions were entered before March 31, 2010. 
See, e.g., USA v. Chaidez, 2010 WL 2740282 (N.D.I1L, July 8, 2010) United States v. Obonaga, 2010 WL 
2629748 (EDNY June 24, 2010); People v. Bennett, 901 N.Y.S.2s 696, 700 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2010). 
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not decide to apply Padilla retro-actively, a finding concerning the date at which 
the Petitioner knew or should have known about the flaw in his counsel's 
performance becomes crucial. As noted above, the standard is abuse of discretion 
and because it is, in a way, a challenge to part of the factual rulings of the court, 
typically, an Appellant would marshal the facts in support of his position. 
However, this case is analogous to Woodward v. Fazzio, where an insufficiency of 
factual findings and the court in that case held, "There is, in effect, no need for an 
appellant to marshal the evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they 
cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations. In other words, the 
way to attack findings which appear to be complete and which are sufficiently 
detailed is to marshal the supporting evidence and then demonstrate the evidence is 
inadequate to sustain such findings. But where the findings are not of that caliber, 
appellant need not go through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can 
simply argue the legal insufficiency of the court's findings as framed." Woodward, 
823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah App. 1991). 
In this case, at the conclusion of the 25 August hearing on the State's Motion 
to Dismiss, Judge Trease noted that based upon the information presented she had 
no "information as to when it was that Mr. Jelashovic became aware" (R. 272 
[34:8-14]). She then specifically set the next hearing to address that issue. At the 
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subsequent hearing on 7 October 2010, Petitioner put on uncontroverted evidence 
that he first discovered his immigration problem in August of 2009, and didn't 
receive official notification from ICE officials until 15 October, 2009 (R. 
273[25:16-27:25]). This evidence was corroborated by a letter from the 
Department of Corrections indicating that the only time anyone from ICE visited 
with Mr. Jelashovic during his entire stay at the prison was on October 15, 2009 
(R. 268). Because the record is clear on this issue, even if this Court finds that 
Padilla is not retro-active in applicability, it is clear that Mr. Jelashovicfs PCRA 
petition was nevertheless timely filed, having been submitted in March of 2010, 
well under a year from the date he found out that VanCampen's immigration advice 
was incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, Mr. Jelashovicfs attorney, David VanCampen provided 
immigration advice to his client that was patently wrong. Because of this, the plea 
entered by Mr. Jelashovic was invalid and the result of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Kentucky v. 
Padilla, clarified how crucial it is for a non-citizen to receive correct advice within 
i 
the framework of a criminal case. 
Because of this erroneous advice, Petitioner prays that this Court overturn 
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the District Court's denial of his Petition for Relief. Specifically, Petitioner urges 
this court to reverse the lower court's findings that the advice given to Petitioner 
was not wrong and that it was not prejudicial to the Petitioner. 
Finally, should this Court find it necessary, Petitioner prays that this Court 
find that the clear evidence in the record shows that the original Petition for Relief 
was filed timely, that is to say, within a year of Petitioner's discovery of his 
pending deportation. 
Edward u. Flint 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN A: ACT 101 - DEFINITIONS 
Sec. 101. [8 U.S.C. 1101] (a) As used in this Act-
(1) The term "administrator" means the official designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to 
section 104(b) of this Act. 
(2) The term "advocates" includes, but is not limited to, advises, recommends, furthers by overt act, 
and admits belief in. 
(3) The term "alien" means any person not a citizen or national of the United States. 
(4) The term "application for admission" has reference to the application for admission into the 
United States and not to the application for the issuance of an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa. 
(5) The term "Attorney General" means the Attorney General of the United States. 
(6) The term "border crossing identification card" means a document of identity bearing that 
designation issued to an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or to an alien who 
is a resident in foreign contiguous territory, by a consular officer or an immigration officer for the 
purpose of crossing over the borders between the United States and foreign contiguous territory in 
accordance with such conditions for its issuance and use as may be prescribed by regulations. 
Such regulati ons shall provide that (A) each such document include a biometric identifier (such as 
the fingerprint or handprint of the alien) that is machine readable and (B) an alien presenting a 
border crossing identification is not permitted to cross over the border into the United States unless 
the biometric identifier contained on the card matches the appropriate biometric characteristic of 
the alien. 1/ 
(7) The term "clerk of court" means a clerk of a naturalization court. 
(8) The terms "Commissioner" and "Deputy Commissioner" mean the Commissioner of 
Immigration and Naturalization and a Deputy Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, 
respectively. 
(9) The term "consular officer" means any consular, diplomatic, or other officer la/ or employee of 
the United States designated under regulations prescribed under authority contained in this Act, for 
the purpose of issuing immigrant or nonimmigrant visas la/or, when used in title III, for the 
purpose of adjudicating nationality. 
(10) The term "crewman" means a person serving in any capacity on board a vessel or aircraft. 
(11) The term "diplomatic visa" means a nonimmigrant visa bearing that title and issued to a 
nonimmigrant in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary of State may prescribe. 
(12) The term "doctrine" includes, but is not limited to, policies, practices, purposes, aims, or 
procedures. 
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(13) 2/_(A) The terms "admission" and "admitted" mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of 
the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. 
(B) An alien who is paroled under section 212(d)(5) or permitted to land temporarily as an alien 
crewman shall not be considered to have been admitted. 
(C) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded 
as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the 
alien-
(i) has abandoned or relinquished that status, 
(ii) has been absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days, 
(iii) has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States, 
(iv) has departed from the United States while under legal process seeking removal of the alien 
from the United States, including removal proceedings under this Act and extradition proceedings, 
(v) has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2), unless since such offense the alien 
has been granted relief under section 212(h) or 240A(a), or 
(vi) is attempting to enter at a time or place other than as designated by immigration officers or has 
not been admitted to the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. 
(14) The term "foreign state" includes outlying possessions of a foreign state, but self-governing 
dominions and territories under mandate or trusteeship shall be regarded as separate foreign 
states. 
(15) The term "immigrant" means every alien except an alien who is within one of the following 
classes of nonimmigrant aliens 
(A) (i) an ambassador, public minister, or career diplomatic or consular officer who has been i 
accredited by a foreign government recognized de jure by the United States and who is accepted 
by the President or by the Secretary of State, and the members of the alien's immediate family; 
(ii) upon a basis of reciprocity, other officials and employees who have been accredited by a 
foreign government recognized de jure by the United States, who are accepted by the Secretary of 
State, and the members of their immediate families; and 
(iii) upon a basis of reciprocity, attendants, servants, personal employees, and members of their 
immediate families, of the officials and employees who have a nonimmigrant status under (i) and 
(ii) above; i 
(B) an alien (other than one coming for the purpose of study or of performing skilled or unskilled 
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labor or as a representative of foreign press, radio, film, or other foreign information media coming 
to engage in such vocation) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of 
abandoning and who is visiting the United States temporarily for business or temporarily for 
pleasure; 
(C) an alien in immediate and continuous transit through the United States, or an alien who 
qualifies as a person entitled to pass in transit to and from the United Nations Headquarters District 
and foreign countries, under the provisions of paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) of section 11 of the 
Headquarters Agreement with the United Nations (61 Stat. 758); 
(D) (i) an alien crewman serving in good faith as such in a capacity required for normal operation 
and service on board a vessel, as defined in section 258(a) (other than a fishing vessel having its 
home port or an operating base in the United States), or aircraft, who intends to land temporarily 
and solely in pursuit of his calling as a crewman and to depart from the United States with the 
vessel or aircraft on which he arrived or some other vessel or aircraft; 
(ii) an alien crewman serving in good faith as such in any capacity required for normal operations 
and service aboard a fishing vessel having its home port or an operating base in the United States 
who intends to land temporarily in Guam or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
23/ and solely in pursuit of his calling as a crewman and to depart from Guam or the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 23/ with the vessel on which he arrived; 
(E) an alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the provisions of a treaty 
of commerce and navigation between the United States and the foreign state of which he is a 
national, and the spouse and children of any such alien if accompanying or following to join him: 
(i) solely to carry on substantial trade, including trade in services or trade in technology, principally 
between the United States and the foreign state of which he is a national; 217 
(ii) solely to develop and direct the operations of an enterprise in which he has invested, or of an 
enterprise in which he is actively in the process of investing, a substantial amount of capital; or 
(iii) 21/solely to perform services in a specialty occupation in the United States if the alien is a 
national of the Commonwealth of Australia and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor 
determines and certifies to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State that the 
intending employer has filed with the Secretary of Labor an attestation under section 212(t)(l); 
(F) (0 3/_an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning, 
who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course of study and who seeks to enter the 
United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing such a course of study consistent 
with section 214(1) at an established college, university, seminary, conservatory, academic high 
school, elementary school, or other academic institution or in a language 3/Jraining program in the 
United States, particularly designated by him and approved by the Attorney General after 
consultation with the Secretary of Education, which institution or place of study shall have agreed 
to report to the Attorney General the termination of attendance of each nonimmigrant student, and 
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if any such institution of learning or place of study fails to make reports promptly the approval shall 
be withdrawn, 
(ii) 3d/the alien spouse and minor children of any alien described in clause (i) if accompanying or 
following to join such an alien, and 
(iii) 3d/an alien who is a national of Canada or Mexico, who maintains actual residence and place 
of abode in the country of nationality, who is described in clause (i) except that the alien's 
qualifications for and actual course of study may be full or part-time, and who commutes to the 
United States institution or place of study from Canada or Mexico; 
(G) (i) a designated principal resident representative of a foreign government recognized de jure by 
the United States, which foreign government is a member of an international organization entitled 
to enjoy privileges, exemptions, and immunities as an international organization under the 
International Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669) 22 U.S.C. 288, note, accredited resident 
members of the staff of such representatives, and members of his or their immediate family; 
(ii) other accredited representatives of such a foreign government to such international 
organizations, and the members of their immediate families; 
(iii) an alien able to qualify under (i) or (ii) above except for the fact that the government of which 
such alien is an accredited representative is not recognized de jure by the United States, or that 
the government of which he is an accredited representative is not a member of such international 
organization, and the members of his immediate family; 
(iv) officers, or employees of such international organizations, and the members of their immediate 
families; 
(v) attendants, servants, and personal employees of any such representative, officer, or employee, 
and the members of the immediate families of such attendants, servants, and personal employees; 
(H) an alien (i) 3a/ 3b/ (b) subject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United < 
States to perform services (other than services described in subclause (a) during the period in 
which such subclause applies and other than services described in subclause (H)(3) or in 
subparagraph (O) or (P)) in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(l) or as a fashion 
model, who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) or, in the case 
of a fashion model, is of distinguished merit and ability, and with respect to whom the Secretary of 
Labor determines and certifies to the Attorney General that the intending employer has filed with 
the Secretary an application under section 3b/212(n)(l), or (b1) who is entitled to enter the United 
States under and in pursuance of the provisions of an agreement listed in section 214(g)(8)(A), 
who is engaged in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(3), and with respect to whom 
the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
Secretary of State that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary of Labor an attestation ( 
under section 212(t)(l), or (c) 3b/ who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform 
services as a registered nurse, who meets the qualifications described in section 212(m)(l), and 
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with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the Attorney General that 
an unexpired attestation is on file and in effect under section 212(m)(2)for the facility (as defined in 
section 212(m)(6)) for which the alien will perform the services; or 
(ii) (a) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is 
coming temporarily to the United States to perform agricultural labor or services, as defined by the 
Secretary of Labor in regulations and including agricultural labor defined in section 3121(g) of 
3bbb/ the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, agriculture as defined in section 3(f) of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203(f)), and the pressing of apples for cider on a farm, of a 
temporary or seasonal nature, or 
(b) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming 
temporarily to the United States to perform other temporary service or labor if unemployed persons 
capable of performing such service or labor cannot be found in this country, but this clause shall 
not apply to graduates of medical schools coming to the United States to perform services as 
members of the medical profession; or 
(iii) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming 
temporarily to the United States as a trainee, other than to receive graduate medical education or 
training, in a training program that is not designed primarily to provide productive employment; and 
the alien spouse and minor children of any such alien specified in this paragraph if accompanying 
him or following to join him; 
(I) upon a basis of reciprocity, an alien who is a bona fide representative of foreign press, radio, 
film, or other foreign information media, who seeks to enter the United States solely to engage in 
such vocation, and the spouse and children of such a representative if accompanying or following 
to join him; 
(J) an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is 
a bona fide student, scholar, trainee, teacher, professor, research assistant, specialist, or leader in 
a field of specialized knowledge or skill, or other person of similar description, who is coming 
temporarily to the United States as a participant in a program designated by the Director of the 
United States Information Agency, for the purpose of teaching, instructing or lecturing, studying, 
observing, conducting research, consulting, demonstrating special skills, or receiving training and 
who, if he is coming to the United States to participate in a program under which he will receive 
graduate medical education or training, also meets the requirements of section 212(j), and the 
alien spouse and minor children of any such alien if accompanying him or following to join him; 
(K) 3bb/ subject to subsections (d) and (p) of section 214, an alien who-
(i) is the fiancee or fiance of a citizen of the United States 3bb/ (other than a citizen described in 
section 204(a)(l)(A)(viii)(I)) and who seeks to enter the United States solely to conclude a valid 
marriage with the petitioner within ninety days after admission; 
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(ii) has concluded a valid marriage with a citizen of the United States 3bb/ (other than a citizen 
described in section 204(a)(l)(A)(viii)(I)) who is the petitioner, is the beneficiary of a petition to 
accord a status under section 201(b)(2)(A)(T) that was filed under section 204 by the petitioner, and 
seeks to enter the United States to await the approval of such petition and the availability to the 
alien of an immigrant visa; or 
(iii) is the minor child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or following to 
join, the alien; 
(L) 3c/ subject to section 214(c)(2), an alien who, within 3 years preceding the time of his 
application for admission into the United States, has been employed continuously for one year by a 
firm or corporation or other legal entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter 
the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his services to the same employer or a 
subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge, and the alie n spouse and minor children of any such alien if accompanying him or 
following to join him; 
(M) (i) an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning 
who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing a full 
course of study at an established vocational or other recognized nonacademic institution (other 
than in a language training program) in the United States particularly designated by him and 
approved by the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Education, which 
institution shall have agreed to report to the Attorney General the termination of attendance of each 
nonimmigrant nonacademic student and if any such institution fails to make reports promptly the 
approval shall be withdrawn, 
(ii) 3d/the alien spouse and minor children of any alien described in clause (i) if accompanying or 
following to join such an alien, and
 { 
(iii) 3d/an alien who is a national of Canada or Mexico, who maintains actual residence and place 
of abode in the country of nationality, who is described in clause (i) except that the alien's course of 
study may be full or part-time, and who commutes to the United States institution or place of study 
from Canada or Mexico; 
i 
(N) (i) the parent of an alien accorded the status of special immigrant under paragraph (27)(l)(i) 4/ 
(or under analogous authority under paragraph (27)(L)), but only if and while the alien is a child, or 
(ii) a child of such parent or of an alien accorded the status of a special immigrant under clause (ii), 
(iii), or (iv) of paragraph (27)(l) 4/_(or under analogous authority under paragraph (27)(L)); 
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(O) an alien who: 
(i) has extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics which has been 
demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim or, with regard to motion picture and 
television productions a demonstrated record of extraordinary achievement, and whose 
achievements have been recognized in the field through extensive documentation, and seeks to 
enter the United States to continue work in the area of extraordinary ability; or 
(ii)(l) seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of accompanying and 
assisting in the artistic or athletic performance by an alien who is admitted under clause (i) for a 
specific event or events, 
(II) is an integral part of such actual performance, 
(lll)(a) has critical skills and experience with such alien which are not of a general nature and which 
cannot be performed by other individuals, or 
(b) in the case of a motion picture or television production, has skills and experience with such 
alien which are not of a general nature and which are critical either based on a pre-existing long-
standing working relationship or, with respect to the specific production, because significant 
production (including pre- and post-production work) will take place both inside and outside the 
United States and the continuing participation of the alien is essential to the successful completion 
of the production, and 
(IV) has a foreign residence which the alien has no intention of abandoning; or 
(iii) is the alien spouse or child of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) and is accompanying, or 
following to join, the alien; 
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INA: ACT 201 - WORLDWIDE LEVEL OF IMMIGRATION 
(b) Aliens Not Subject to Direct Numerical Limitations. - Aliens described in this subsection, who 
are not subject to the worldwide levels or numerical limitations of subsection (a), are as follows: 
(1) (A) Special immigrants described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 101(a)(27). 
(B) Aliens who are admitted under section 207 or whose status is adjusted under section 209 . 
(C) Aliens whose status is adjusted to permanent residence under section 210 , or 245A . 
(D) Aliens whose removal is canceled under section 240A(a). 
(E) Aliens provided permanent resident status under section 249 . 
8 
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INA: ACT 212 - GENERAL CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE VISAS AND 
INELIGIBLE FOR ADMISSION; WAIVERS OF INADMISSIBILITY 
Sec. 212. [8U.S.C. 1182] 
(a) Classes of Aliens Ineligible for Visas or Admission.-Except as otherwise provided in this Act, 
aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and 
ineligible to be admitted to the United States: 
(1) Health-related grounds.-
(A) In general.-Any alien-
(i) who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services) to have a communicable disease of public health significance; \b[ 
(ii) 1/ except as provided in subparagraph (C) 1a/who seeks admission as an immigrant, or who 
seeks adjustment of status to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and 
who has failed to present documentation of having received vaccination against vaccine-
preventable diseases, which shall include at least the following diseases: mumps, measles, 
rubella, polio, tetanus and diphtheria toxoids, pertussis, influenza type B and hepatitis B, and any 
other vaccinations against vaccine-pre ventable diseases recommended by the Advisory 
Committee for Immunization Practices, 
(iii) who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services in consultation with the Attorney General)-
(I) to have a physical or mental disorder and behavior associated with the disorder that may pose, 
or has posed, a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others, or 
(II) to have had a physical or mental disorder and a history of behavior associated with the 
disorder, which behavior has posed a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others 
and which behavior is likely to recur or to lead to other harmful behavior, or 
(iv) who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services) to be a drug abuser or addict, is inadmissible. 
(B) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of certain clauses of subparagraph (A), see 
subsection (g). 
(C) ^EXCEPTION FROM IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENT FOR ADOPTED CHILDREN 10 
YEARS OF AGE OR YOUNGER.-Clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a child who-
(i) is 10 years of age or younger, 
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(ii) is described in section lOUbXlXF) , and 
(iii) is seeking an immigrant visa as an immediate relative under section 201(b), if, prior to the 
admission of the child, an adoptive parent or prospective adoptive parent of the child, who has 
sponsored the child for admission as an immediate relative, has executed an affidavit stating that 
the parent is aware of the provisions of subparagraph (A)(ii) and will ensure that, within 30 days of 
the child's admission, or at the earliest time that is medically appropriate, the child will receive the 
vaccinations identified in such subparagraph. 
(2) Criminal and related grounds.-
(A) Conviction of certain crimes.-
(i) In general.-Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having 
committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-
(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense or an attempt or 
conspiracy to commit such a crime), or 
(II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United 
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the 
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), is inadmissible. 
(ii) Exception.-Clause (i)(l) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if-
(I) the crime was committed when the alien was under 18 years of age, and the crime was 
committed (and the alien released from any confinement to a prison or correctional institution 
imposed for the crime) more than 5 years before the date of application for a visa or other 
documentation and the date of application for admission to the United States, or 
(II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien 
admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted < 
the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of 
such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months 
(regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed). 
(B) Multiple criminal convictions.-Any alien convicted of 2 or more offenses (other than purely 
political offenses), regardless of whether the conviction was in a single trial or whether the offenses 
arose from a single scheme of misconduct and regardless of whether the offenses involved moral 
turpitude, for which the aggregate sentences to confinement 2/ were 5 years or more is 
inadmissible. 
( 
(C) 2a/ CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE TRAFFICKERS- Any alien who the consular officer or the 
Attorney General knows or has reason to believe-
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(i) is or has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance or in any listed chemical (as defined 
in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), or is or has been a knowing 
aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such 
controlled or listed substance or chemical, or endeavored to do so; or 
(ii) is the spouse, son, or daughter of an alien inadmissible under clause (i), has, within the 
previous 5 years, obtained any financial or other benefit from the illicit activity of that alien, and 
knew or reasonably should have known that the financial or other benefit was the product of such 
illicit activity, is inadmissaible. 
(D) Prostitution and commercialized vice.-Any alien who-
(i) is coming to the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution, or has 
engaged in prostitution within 10 years of the date of application for a visa, admission, or 
adjustment of status, 
(ii) directly or indirectly procures or attempts to procure, or (within 10 years of the date of 
application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status) procured or attempted to procure or to 
import, prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitution, or receives or (within such 10- year 
period) received, in whole or in part, the proceeds of prostitution, or 
(iii) is coming to the United States to engage in any other unlawful commercialized vice, whether or 
not related to prostitution, is inadmissible. 
(E) Certain aliens involved in serious criminal activity who have asserted immunity from 
prosecution.-Any alien-
(i) who has committed in the United States at any time a serious criminal offense (as defined in 
section 101(h)), 
(ii) for whom immunity from criminal jurisdiction was exercised with respect to that offense, 
(iii) who as a consequence of the offense and exercise of immunity has departed from the United 
States, and 
(iv) who has not subsequently submitted fully to the jurisdiction of the court in the United States 
having jurisdiction with respect to that offense, is inadmissible. 
(F) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of certain subparagraphs of this paragraph, 
see subsection (h). 
(G) 2b/ 2c/ FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO HAVE COMMITTED 
PARTICULARLY SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM- Any alien who, while 
serving as a foreign government official, was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time, 
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particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined in section 3 of the International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6402), is inadmissible. 
(H) 2bb_/ SIGNIFICANT TRAFFICKERS IN PERSONS-
(i) IN GENERAL- Any alien who commits or conspires to commit human trafficking offenses in the 
United States or outside the United States , 42/or who the consular officer, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, 42/or the Attorney General knows or has reason to 
believe is or has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with such a 
trafficker in severe forms of trafficking in persons, as defined in the section 103 of such Act, is 
inadmissible. 
(ii) BENEFICIARIES OF TRAFFICKING- Except as provided in clause (iii), any alien who the 
consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe is the spouse, or daughter 
of an alien inadmissible under clause (i), has, within the previous 5 years, obtained any financial or 
other benefit from the illicit activity of that alien, and knew or reasonably should have known that 
the financial or other benefit was the product of such illicit activity, is inadmissible. 
(iii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN SONS AND DAUGHTERS- Clause (ii) shall not apply to a son or 
daughter who was a child at the time he or she received the benefit described in such clause. 
(I) 2bbb/ MONEY LAUNDERING- Any alien-
(i) who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reason to believe, has engaged, is 
engaging, or seeks to enter the United States to engage, in an offense which is described in 
section 1956 or 1957 of title 18, United States Code (relating to laundering of monetary 
instruments); or 
(ii) who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows is, or has been, a knowing aider, abettor, 
assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in an offense which is described in such section; is 
inadmissible. 
( 
(3) Security and related grounds.-
(A) In general.-Any alien who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable 
ground to believe, seeks to enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in-
(i) any activity (I) to violate any law of the United States relating to espionage or sabotage or (II) to 
violate or evade any law prohibiting the export from the United States of goods, technology, or 
sensitive information, 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(ii) any other unlawful activity, or 
(iii) any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the 
Government of the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means, is inadmissible. 
(B) Terrorist activities-
(i) 3/4/4a/IN GENERAL-Any alien who-
(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity, 
(II) a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security knows, or has 
reasonable ground to believe, is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity 
(as defined in clause (iv)); 
(III) has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm, incited 
terrorist activity; 
(IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of--
(aa) a terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or 
(bb) a political, social, or other group that endorses or espouses terrorist activity; 
(V) is a member of a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi); 
(VI) is a member of a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(lll), unless the alien can 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alien did not know, and should not 
reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; 
(VII) endorses or espouses terrorist activity or persuades others to endorse or espouse terrorist 
activity or support a terrorist organization; 
(VIII) has received military-type training (as defined in section 2339D(c)(1) of title 18, United States 
Code) from or on behalf of any organization that, at the time the training was received, was a 
terrorist organization (as defined in clause (vi)); or 
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(IX) is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under this subparagraph, if the activity 
causing the alien to be found inadmissible occurred within the last 5 years, is inadmissible. 
4/ (ii) EXCEPTION- Subclause (IX) 4d/ of claused) does not apply to a spouse or child-
(I) who did not know or should not reasonably have known of the activity causing the alien to be 
found inadmissible under this section; or 
(II) whom the consular officer or Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe has renounced 
the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible under this section. 
4/_(iii) TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED.-As used in this Act, the term "terrorist activity" means 
any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if 4/jt 
had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or 
any State) and which involves any of the following: 
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle). 
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual 
in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from 
doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained. 
(Ill) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of 
title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of such a person. 
(IV) An assassination. 
(V) The use of any-
i 
(aa) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or 
(bb) explosive, 4/_firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal 
monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals 
or to cause substantial damage to property. 
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(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. 
(iv) 4/ 4b/ ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED- As used in this chapter, the term 
"engage in terrorist activity" means, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization-
(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or 
serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; 
(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity; 
(III) to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity; 
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for-
(aa) a terrorist activity; 
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(l) or (vi)(ll); or 
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(lll), unless the solicitor can demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that 
the organization was a terrorist organization; 
(V) to solicit any individual— 
(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this subsection; 
(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(l) or (vi)(ll); or 
(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(lll) unless the solicitor can 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably 
have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; or 
(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support, 
including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material 
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financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or 
radiological weapons), explosives, or training--
(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity; 
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has committed or plans to 
commit a terrorist activity; 
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi) or to any member of 
such an organization; or 
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(lll), or to any member of such an 
organization, unless the actor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did 
not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist 
organization. 
5/_(v) REPRESENTATIVE DEFINED.-As used in this paragraph, the term "representative" includes 
an officer, official, or spokesman of an organization, and any person who directs, counsels, 
commands, or induces an organization or its members to engage in terrorist activity. 
(vi) 5a/4c TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DEFINED- As used in this section, the term 'terrorist 
organization' means an organization-
(I) designated under section 219 ; 
(II) otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the Secretary of State in 
consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, as a terrorist organization, after finding that the organization engages in the activities 
described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv); or 
(III) that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a 
subgroup which engages in, the activities described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv). i 
(C) Foreign policy.-
(i) In general.-An alien whose entry or proposed activities in the United States the Secretary of 
State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy 
consequences for the United States is inadmissible. 
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(ii) Exception for officials.-An alien who is an official of a foreign government or a purported 
government, or who is a candidate for election to a foreign government office during the period 
immediately preceding the election for that office, shall not be excludable or subject to restrictions 
or conditions on entry into the United States under clause (i) solely because of the alien's past, 
current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or 
associations wo uld be lawful within the United States. 
(iii) Exception for other aliens.-An alien, not described in clause (ii), shall not be excludable or 
subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the United States under clause (i) because of the 
alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or 
associations would be lawful within the United States, unless the Secretary of State personally 
determines that the alien's admission would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy 
interest. 
(iv) Notification of determinations.-If a determination is made under clause (iii) with respect to an 
alien, the Secretary of State must notify on a timely basis the chairmen of the Committees on the 
Judiciary and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and of the Committees on the 
Judiciary and Foreign Relations of the Senate of the identity of the alien and the reasons for the 
determination. 
(D) Immigrant membership in totalitarian party.-
(i) In general.-Any immigrant who is or has been a member of or affiliated with the Communist or 
any other totalitarian party (or subdivision or affiliate thereof), domestic or foreign, is inadmissible. 
(ii) Exception for involuntary membership.-Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien because of 
membership or affiliation if the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer when 
applying for a visa (or to the satisfaction of the Attorney General when applying for admission) that 
the membership or affiliation is or was involuntary, or is or was solely when under 16 years of age, 
by operation of law, or for purposes of obtaining employment, food rations, or other essentials of 
living and whethe r necessary for such purposes. 
(iii) Exception for past membership.-Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien because of membership 
or affiliation if the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer when applying for a 
visa (or to the satisfaction of the Attorney General when applying for admission) that-
(I) the membership or affiliation terminated at least-
(aa) 2 years before the date of such application, or 
(bb) 5 years before the date of such application, in the case of an alien whose membership or 
affiliation was with the party controlling the government of a foreign state that is a totalitarian 
dictatorship as of such date, and 
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(II) the alien is not a threat to the security of the United States. 
(iv) Exception for close family members.-The Attorney General may, in the Attorney General's 
discretion, waive the application of clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the parent, spouse, 
son, daughter, brother, or sister of a citizen of the United States or a spouse, son, or daughter of 
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for humanitarian purposes, to assure family 
unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest if the immigrant is not a threat to the security of 
the United States. 
(E) 5aaa/PARTICIPANTS IN NAZI PERSECUTION, GENOCIDE, OR THE COMMISSION OF 
ANY ACT OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING 
(i) Participation in nazi persecutions.-Any alien who, during the period beginning on March 23, 
1933, and ending on May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with-
(I) the Nazi government of Germany, 
(II) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi government of 
Germany, 
(III) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi government of 
Germany, or 
(IV) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, ordered, incited, 
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, 
national origin, or political opinion is inadmissible. 
(ii) Participation in genocide.-Any alien who 5aaa/ ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
participated 5ab/ in genocide, as defined in section 1091(a) of title 18, United States Code, is 
inadmissible. 
(iii) 5aaa/ COMMISSION OF ACTS OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS- Any 
alien who, outside the United States, has committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
participated in the commission of--
(I) any act of torture, as defined in section 2340 of title 18, United States Code; or 
(II) under color of law of any foreign nation, any extrajudicial killing, as defined in section 3(a) of 
the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350 note), is inadmissible. 
5aa/ (F) ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS- Any alien who the Secretary of 
State, after consultation with the Attorney General, or the Attorney General, after consultation with 
the Secretary of State, determines has been associated with a terrorist organization and intends 
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while in the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in activities that could 
endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States is inadmissible. 
(G) 41/RECRUITMENT OR USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS- Any alien who has engaged in the 
recruitment or use of child soldiers in violation of section 2442 of title 18, United States Code, is 
inadmissible. 
(4) Public charge.-
(A) In general.-Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a 
visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment 
of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible. 6/ 
(B) Factors to be taken into account.- (i) In determining whether an alien is excludable under this 
paragraph, the consular officer or the Attorney General shall at a minimum consider the alien's-
(I) age; 
(II) health; 
(III) family status; 
(IV) assets, resources, and financial status; and 
(V) education and skills 
(ii) In addition to the factors under clause (i), the consular officer or the Attorney General may also 
consider any affidavit of support under section 213Afor purposes of exclusion under this 
paragraph. 
(C) Family-Sponsored immigrants.-Any alien who seeks admission or adjustment of status under a 
visa issued under section 201(b)(2) or 203(a) is excludable under this paragraph unless-
(i) the alien has obtained-
(I) status as a spouse or a child of a United States citizen pursuant to clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) or 
section 204(a)(1)(A), or 
(II) classification pursuant to clause (ii) or (iii) of section 204(a)(1)(B); 6aa/ 
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(Ill) 6aa/ classification or status as a VAWA self-petitioner; or 
(ii) the person petitioning for the alien's admission 6a/ (and any additional sponsor required under 
section 213A(f) or any alternative sponsor permitted under paragraph (5)(B) of such section) has 
executed an affidavit of support described in section 213A with respect to such alien. 
(D) Certain employment-based immigrants.-Any alien who seeks admission or adjustment of status 
under a visa number issued under section 203(b) by virtue of a classification petition filed by a 
relative of the alien (or by an entity in which such relative has a significant ownership interest) is 
excludable under this paragraph unless such relative has executed an affidavit of support 
described in section 213A with respect to such alien. 
(5) Labor certification and qualifications for certain immigrants.-
(A) Labor certification.-
(i) In general.-Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled 
or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the 
Secretary of State and the Attorney General that-
(I) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of 
an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to 
the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and 
(II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of 
workers in the United States similarly employed. 
(ii) Certain aliens subject to special rule.-For purposes of clause (i)(l), an alien described in this 
clause is an alien who-
(I) is a member of the teaching profession, or 
(II) has exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts, 
(iii) ^ P R O F E S S I O N A L A T H L E T E S -
(I) In general.-A certification made under clause (i) with respect to a professional athlete shall 
remain valid with respect to the athlete after the athlete changes employer, if the new employer is a 
team in the same sport as the team which employed the athlete when the athlete first applied for 
certification. 
(II) Definition.-For purposes of subclause (I), the term "professional athlete" means an individual 
who is employed as an athlete by-
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(aa) a team that is a member of an association of 6 or more professional sports teams whose total 
combined revenues exceed $10,000,000 per year, if the association governs the conduct of its 
members and regulates the contests and exhibitions in which its member teams regularly engage; 
or 
(bb) any minor league team that is affiliated with such an association. 
(iv) 7/.LONG D E L A Y E D A D J U S T M E N T APPL ICANTS- A certification made under clause (i) with 
respect to an individual whose petition is covered by section 204(j) shall remain valid with respect 
to a new job accepted by the individual after the individual changes jobs or employers if the new 
job is in the same or a similar occupational classification as the job for which the certification was 
issued. 
(B) Unqualified physicians.-An alien who is a graduate of a medical school not accredited by a 
body or bodies approved for the purpose by the Secretary of Education (regardless of whether 
such school of medicine is in the United States) and who is coming to the United States principally 
to perform services as a member of the medical profession is inadmissible, unless the alien (i) has 
passed parts I and II of the National Board of Medical Examiners Examination (or an equivalent 
examination as dete rmined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services) and (ii) is competent 
in oral and written English. For purposes of the previous sentence, an alien who is a graduate of a 
medical school shall be considered to have passed parts I and II of the National Board of Medical 
Examiners if the alien was fully and permanently licensed to practice medicine in a State on 
January 9, 1978, and was practicing medicine in a State on that date. 
(C) Uncertified foreign health-care workers 7a/ Subject to subsection (r), any alien who seeks to 
enter the United States for the purpose of performing labor as a health-care worker, other than a 
physician, is excludable unless the alien presents to the consular officer, or, in the case of an 
adjustment of status, the Attorney General, a certificate from the Commission on Graduates of 
Foreign Nursing Schools, or a certificate from an equivalent independent credentialing organization 
approved by the Attorney General in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, verifying that-
(i) the alien's education, training, license, and experience-
(I) meet all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements for entry into the United States under 
the classification specified in the application; 
(II) are comparable with that required for an American health-care worker of the same type; and 
(III) are authentic and, in the case of a license, unencumbered; 
(ii) the alien has the level of competence in oral and written English considered by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, to be appropriate for 
health care work of the kind in which the alien will be engaged, as shown by an appropriate score 
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on one or more nationally recognized, commercially available, standardized assessments of the 
applicant's ability to speak and write; and 
(iii) if a majority of States licensing the profession in which the alien intends to work recognize a 
test predicting the success on the profession's licensing or certification examination, the alien has 
passed such a test, or has passed such an examination. 
For purposes of clause (ii), determination of the standardized tests required and of the minimum 
scores that are appropriate are within the sole discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services and are not subject to further administrative or judicial review. 
(D) Application of grounds.-The grounds of inadmissibility of aliens under subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) shall apply to immigrants seeking admission or adjustment of status under paragraph (2) or (3) 
of section 203(b). 
(6) Illegal entrants and immigration violators.-
(A) 8LALIENS PRESENT WITHOUT admission or parole.-
(i) In general.-An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who 
arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, 
is inadmissible. 
(ii) Exception for certain battered women and children.-Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien who 
demonstrates that-
(I) the alien is a VAWA self-petitioner; 6aa/ 
(H)(3) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent, or by a 
member of the spouse's or parent's family residing in the same household as the alien and the 
spouse or parent consented or acquiesced to such battery or cruelty, or (b) the alien's child has 
been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent of the alien (without the active 
participation of the alien in the battery or cruelty) or by a member of the spouse's or parent's family 
resi ding in the same household as the alien when the spouse or parent consented to or 
acquiesced in such battery or cruelty and the alien did not actively participate in such battery or 
cruelty, and 
(III) there was a substantial connection between the battery or cruelty described in subclause (I) or 
(II) and the alien's unlawful entry into the United States. 
(B) Failure to attend removal proceeding.-Any alien who without reasonable cause fails or refuses 
to attend or remain in attendance at a proceeding to determine the alien's inadmissibility or 
deportability and who seeks admission to the United States within 5 years of such alien's 
subsequent departure or removal is inadmissible. 
(C) Misrepresentation.-
(i) In general.-Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure 
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(or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the 
United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible. 
(ii) 9/FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP-
(I) IN GENERAL- Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to 
be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this Act (including section 274A) 
or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible. 
(II) EXCEPTION- In the case of an alien making a representation described in subclause (I), if each 
natural parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adoptive parent of the alien) is 
or was a citizen (whether by birth or naturalization), the alien permanently resided in the United 
States prior to attaining the age of 16, and the alien reasonably believed at the time of making such 
representation that he or she was a citizen, the alien shall not be considered to be inadmissible 
under any provision of this subsection based on such representation. 
(iii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (I). 
(D) Stowaways.-Any alien who is a stowaway is inadmissible. 
(E) Smugglers.-
(i) In general.-Any alien who at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or 
aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is inadmissible. 
(ii) Special rule in the case of family reunification.-Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of alien who 
is an eligible immigrant (as defined in section 301(b)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1990), was 
physically present in the United States on May 5, 1988, and is seeking admission as an immediate 
relative or under section 203(a)(2) (including under section 112 of the Immigration Act of 1990) or 
benefits under section 301(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 if the alien, before May 5, 1988, has 
encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter 
(and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law. 
(iii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (d)(11). 
(F) Subject of civil penalty.-
(i) In general.-An alien who is the subject of a final order for violation of section 274C is 
inadmissible. 
(ii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (d)(12). 10/ 
(G) Student visa abusers.-An alien who obtains the status of a nonimmigrant under section 
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101(a)(15)(F)(i) and who violates a term or condition of such status under section 214(1) is 
excludable until the alien has been outside the United States for a continuous period of 5 years 
after the date of the violation. 11/ 
(7) Documentation requirements.-
(A) Immigrants.-
(i) In general.-Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, any immigrant at the time of 
application for admission-
(I) who is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing 
identification card, or other valid entry document required by this Act, and a valid unexpired 
passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality if such 
document is required under the regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 211(a), 
or 
(II) whose visa has been issued without compliance with the provisions of section 203, is 
inadmissible. 
(ii) Waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (k). 
(B) Nonimmigrants.-
(i) In general.-Any nonimmigrant who-
(I) is not in possession of a passport valid for a minimum of six months from the date of the 
expiration of the initial period of the alien's admission or contemplated initial period of stay 
authorizing the alien to return to the country from which the alien came or to proceed to and enter 
some other country during such period, or 
(II) is not in possession of a valid nonimmigrant visa or border crossing identification card at the 
time of application for admission, is inadmissible. 
(ii) General waiver authorized.-For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i), see subsection (d)(4). 
(iii) GUAM AND NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS VISA WAIVER- For provision authorizing 
waiver of clause (i) in the case of visitors to Guam or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, see subsection (1). 38/ 
(iv) VISA WAIVER 11a/PROGRAM.-For authority to waive the requirement of clause (i) under a 
11a/program, see section 217 . 
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(8) Ineligible for citizenship.-
(A) In general.-Any immigrant who is permanently ineligible to citizenship is inadmissible. 
(B) Draft evaders.-Any person who has departed from or who has remained outside the United 
States to avoid or evade training or service in the armed forces in time of war or a period declared 
by the President to be a national emergency is inadmissible, except that this subparagraph shall 
not apply to an alien who at the time of such departure was a nonimmigrant and who is seeking to 
reenter the United States as a nonimmigrant. 
(9) 12/ALIENS PREVIOUSLY REMOVED.-
(A) Certain aliens previously removed.-
(i) Arriving aliens.-Any alien who has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1) or at the end 
of proceedings under section 240 initiated upon the alien's arrival in the United States and who 
again seeks admission within 5 years of the date of such removal (or within 20 years in the case of 
a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated 
felony) is inadmissible. 
(ii) Other aliens.-Any alien not described in clause (i) who-
(I) has been ordered removed under section 240 or any other provision of law, or 
(II) departed the United States while an order of removal was outstanding, and who seeks 
admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal (or within 20 years of 
such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at any time in the case of an alien 
convicted of an aggravated felony) is inadmissible. 
(iii) Exception.-Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission within a period if, 
prior to the date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside the United States or attempt to be 
admitted from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General has consented to the alien's 
reapplying for admission. 
(B) 13/ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT.-
(i) In general.-Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who-
(I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 
year, voluntarily departed the United States (whether or not pursuant to section 244(e)) prior to the 
commencement of proceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240 , and again seeks 
admission within 3 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal, or 
(II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks 
admission within 10 years of the date of such alien's departure or removal from the United States,is 
inadmissible. 
(ii) Construction of unlawful presence.-For purposes of this paragraph, an alien is deemed to be 
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unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States after the 
expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General or is present in the United 
States without being admitted or paroled. 
(iii) Exceptions.-
(I) Minors.-No period of time in which an alien is under 18 years of age shall be taken into account 
in determining the period of unlawful presence in the United States under clause (I). 
(II) Asylees.-No period of time in which an alien has a bona fide application for asylum pending 
under section 208 shall be taken into account in determining the period of unlawful presence in the 
United States under clause (i) unless the alien during such period was employed without 
authorization in the United States. 
(III) Family unity.-No period of time in which the alien is a beneficiary of family unity protection 
pursuant to section 301 of the Immigration Act of 1990 14/shall be taken into account in 
determining the period of unlawful presence in the United States under clause (I). 
(IV) Battered women and children.-Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien who would be described in 
paragraph (6)(A)(ii) if "violation of the terms of the alien's nonimmigrant visa" were substituted for 
"unlawful entry into the United States" in subclause (III) of that paragraph. 
(V) 13a/VICTIMS OF A SEVERE FORM OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS- Clause (i) shall not 
apply to an alien who demonstrates that the severe form of trafficking (as that term is defined in 
section 103 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102)) was at least one 
central reason for the alien's unlawful presence in the United States. 
(iv) Tolling for good cause.-In the case of an alien who-
(I) has been lawfully admitted or paroled into the United States, 
(II) has filed a nonfrivolous application for a change or extension of status before the date of 
expiration of the period of stay authorized by the Attorney General, and 
(III) has not been employed without authorization in the United States before or during the 
pendency of such application,the calculation of the period of time specified in clause (i)(l) shall be 
tolled during the pendency of such application, but not to exceed 120 days. 
(v) Waiver.-The Attorney General has sole discretion to waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant 
who is the spouse or son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal 
of admission to such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully 
resident spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or 
action by the Attorney General regarding a waiver under this clause. * 
(C) Aliens unlawfully present after previous immigration violations.-
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(i) In general.-Any alien who-
(I) has been unlawfully present in the United States for an aggregate period of more than 1 year, or 
(II) has been ordered removed under section 235(b)(1), section 240 , or any other provision of law, 
and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without being admitted is inadmissible. 
(ii) Exception.-Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking admission more than 10 years after the 
date of the alien's last departure from the United States if, prior to the alien's reembarkation at a 
place outside the United States or attempt to be readmitted from a foreign contiguous territory, 14a/ 
6aa/ the Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien's reapplying for admission. 
(iii) 6aa/ WAIVER- The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the application of clause (i) in 
the case of an alien who is a VAWA self-petitioner if there is a connection between-
(I) the alien's battering or subjection to extreme cruelty; and 
(II) the alien's removal, departure from the United States, reentry or reentries into the United States; 
or attempted reentry into the United States. 
(10) 15/MISCELLANEOUS.-
(A) Practicing polygamists.-Any immigrant who is coming to the United States to practice polygamy 
is inadmissible. 
(B) Guardian required to accompany helpless alien.-Any alien-
(i) who is accompanying another alien who is inadmissible and who is certified to be helpless from 
sickness, mental or physical disability, or infancy pursuant to section 232(c), and 
(ii) whose protection or guardianship is determined to be required by the alien described in clause 
(I), is inadmissible. IjS/ 
(C) International child abduction.-
(i) In general.-Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien who, after entry of an order by a court in 
the United States granting custody to a person of a United States citizen child who detains or 
retains the child, or withholds custody of the child, outside the United States from the person 
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granted custody by that order, is inadmissible until the child is surrendered to the person granted 
custody by that order. 
16a/ (ii) ALIENS SUPPORTING ABDUCTORS AND RELATIVES OF ABDUCTORS. - Any alien 
who~ 
(I) is known by the Secretary of State to have intentionally assisted an alien in the conduct 
described in clause (i), 
(II) is known by the Secretary of State to be intentionally providing material support or safe haven 
to an alien described in clause (i), or 
(III) is a spouse (other than the spouse who is the parent of the abducted child), child (other than 
the abducted child), parent, sibling, or agent of an alien described in clause (i), if such person has 
been designated by the Secretary of State at the Secretary's sole and unreviewable discretion, is 
inadmissible until the child described in clause (i) is surrendered to the person granted custody by 
the order described in that clause, and such person and child are permitted to return to the United 
States or such person's place of residence. 
(iii) EXCEPTIONS. - Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply-
(I) to a government official of the United States who is acting within the scope of his or her official 
duties; 
(II) to a government official of any foreign government if the official has been designated by the 
Secretary of State at the Secretary's sole and unreviewable discretion; or 
(III) so long as the child is located in a foreign state that is a party to the Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980. 
(D) 17/UNLAWFUL VOTERS-
(i) IN GENERAL- Any alien who has voted in violation of any Federal, State, or local constitutional 
provision, statute, ordinance, or regulation is inadmissible. 
(ii) EXCEPTION- In the case of an alien who voted in a Federal, State, or local election (including 
an initiative, recall, or referendum) in violation of a lawful restriction of voting to citizens, if each 
natural parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adoptive parent of the alien) is 
or was a citizen (whether by birth or naturalization), the alien permanently resided in the United 
States prior to attaining the age of 16, and the alien reasonably believed at the time of such violatio 
n that he or she was a citizen, the alien shall not be considered to be inadmissible under any 
provision of this subsection based on such violation. 
( 
(E) Former citizens who renounced citizenship to avoid taxation.-Any alien who is a former citizen 
of the United States who officially renounces United States citizenship and who is determined by 
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the Attorney General to have renounced United States citizenship for the purpose of avoiding 
taxation by the United States is excludable. 18/ 
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INA: ACT 236 - APPREHENSION AND DETENTION OF ALIENS 
(c) Detention of Criminal Aliens.-
(1) Custody.-The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who-
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 212(a)(2), 
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
(A)(iii),(B),(C),or(D), 
(C) is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) on the basis of an offense for which the alien has 
been sentence 2/to a term of imprisonment of at least 1 year, or 
(D) is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3)(B) or deportable under section 237(a)(4)(B), when the 
alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or 
probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the 
same offense. 
(2) Release.-The Attorney General may release an alien described in paragraph (1) only if the 
Attorney General decides pursuant to section 3521 of title 18, United States Code, that release of 
the alien from custody is necessary to provide protection to a witness, a potential witness, a person 
cooperating with an investigation into major criminal activity, or an immediate family member or 
close associate of a witness, potential witness, or person cooperating with such an investigation, 
and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of 
other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding. A decision 
relating to such release shall take place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity 
of the offense committed by the alien. 
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INA: ACT 237 - GENERAL CLASSES OF DEPORTABLE ALIENS 
Sec. 237 1/J8U.S.C. 1227] 
(a) Classes of Deportable Aliens.-Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the 
United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or 
more of the following classes of deportable aliens: 
(1) Inadmissible at time of entry or of adjustment of status or violates status.-
(A) Inadmissible aliens.-Any alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or 
more of the classes of aliens inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable. 
(B) 2/ Present in violation of law.-Any alien who is present in the United States in violation of this 
Act or any other law of the 2b/ United States, or whose nonimmigrant visa (or other documentation 
authorizing admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant) has been revoked under section 
221(i), is deportable. 
(C) Violated nonimmigrant status or condition of entry.-
(i) Nonimmigrant status violators.-Any alien who was admitted as a nonimmigrant and who has 
failed to maintain the nonimmigrant status in which the alien was admitted or to which it was 
changed under section 248 , or to comply with the conditions of any such status, is deportable. 
(ii) Violators of conditions of entry.-Any alien whom the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
certifies has failed to comply with terms, conditions, and controls that were imposed under section 
212(g) is deportable. 
(D) Termination of conditional permanent residence.-
(i) In general.-Any alien with permanent resident status on a conditional basis under section 216 
(relating to conditional permanent resident status for certain alien spouses and sons and 
daughters) or under section 216A (relating to conditional permanent resident status for certain 
alien entrepreneurs, spouses, and children) who has had such status terminated under such 
respective section is deportable. 
(ii) Exception.-Clause (i) shall not apply in the cases described in section 216(c)(4) (relating to 
certain hardship waivers). 
(E) Smuggling.-
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(i) In general.-Any alien who (prior to the date of entry, at the time of any entry, or within 5 years of 
the date of any entry) knowingly has encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other 
alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is deportable. 
(ii) Special rule in the case of family reunification.-Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of alien who 
is an eligible immigrant (as defined in section 301(b)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1990), was 
physically present in the United States on May 5, 1988, and is seeking admission as an immediate 
relative or under section 203(a)(2) (including under section 112 of the Immigration Act of 1990) or 
benefits under section 301 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1990 if the alien, before May 5, 1988, has 
en couraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter 
(and no other individual) to enter the United States in violation of law. 
(iii) Waiver authorized.-The Attorney General may, in his discretion for humanitarian purposes, to 
assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest, waive application of clause (i) in 
the case of any alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if the alien has encouraged, 
induced, assisted, abetted, or aided only an individual who at the time of the offense was 3/_the 
alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual) to enter the United States in 
violation of law. 4/ 
(F) [repealed] 5/ 
(G) Marriage fraud.-An alien shall be considered to be deportable as having procured a visa or 
other documentation by fraud (within the meaning of section 212(a)(6)(C)(i)) and to be in the 
United States in violation of this Act (within the meaning of subparagraph (B)) if-
(i) the alien obtains any admission into the United States with an immigrant visa or other 
documentation procured on the basis of a marriage entered into less than 2 years prior to such 
entry of the alien and which, within 2 years subsequent to any admission of the alien in the United 
States, shall be judicially annulled or terminated, unless the alien establishes to the satisfaction of 
the Attorney General that such marriage was not contracted for the purpose of evading any 
provisions of the imm igration laws, or 
(ii) it appears to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien has failed or refused to fulfill 
the alien's marital agreement which in the opinion of the Attorney General was made for the 
purpose of procuring the alien's admission as an immigrant. 
(H) WAIVER AUTHORIZED FOR CERTAIN MISREPRESENTATIONS. - The provisions of this 
paragraph relating to the removal of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were 
inadmissible at the time of admission as aliens described in section 212(a)(6)(C)(i), whether willful 
or innocent, may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, be waived for any alien (other than an 
alien described in paragraph (4)(D)) who-
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(i) 5a/(I) is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or of an alien 
lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; and 
(II) 5a/was in possession of an immigrant visa or equivalent document and was otherwise 
admissible to the United States at the time of such admission except for those grounds of 
inadmissibility specified under paragraphs (5)(A) and (7)(A) of section 212(a) which were a direct 
result of that fraud or misrepresentation. 
(ii) 5a/_5aa/_is a VAWA self-petitioner. 
A waiver of removal for fraud or misrepresentation granted under this subparagraph shall also 
operate to waive removal based on the grounds of inadmissibility directly resulting from such fraud 
or misrepresentation. 
(2) Criminal offenses.-
(A) General crimes.-
(i) Crimes of moral turpitude.-Any alien who-
(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the 
case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status under section 245(i)) after the date of 
admission, and 
(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. 
is deportable 
(ii) Multiple criminal convictions.-Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted of two or 
more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, 
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the convictions were in a single 
trial, is deportable. 
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(iii) Aggravated felony.-Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after 
admission is deportable. 
(iv) High Speed Flight-Any alien who is convicted of a violation of section 758 of title 18, United 
States Code, (relating to high speed flight from an immigration checkpoint) is deportable. 
(v) 5b/_FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER- Any alien who is convicted under 
section 2250 of title 18, United States Code, is deportable. 
(vi) 5b/_Waiver authorized.-Clauses (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) shall not apply in the case of an alien with 
respect to a criminal conviction if the alien subsequent to the criminal conviction has been granted a 
foil and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the 
several States. 
(B) Controlled substances.-
(i) Conviction.-Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a 
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign 
country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances 
Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 
grams or less of marijuana, is deportable. 
(ii) Drug abusers and addicts.-Any alien who is, or at any time after admission has been, a drug 
abuser or addict is deportable. 
(C) Certain firearm offenses.-Any alien who at any time after admission is convicted under any law 
of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying, or of 
attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell, offer for sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, 
any weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device (as defined in section 
921(a) of title 18, United States Code) in violation of any law is deportable. 
(D) Miscellaneous crimes.-Any alien who at any time has been convicted (the judgment on such < 
conviction becoming final) of, or has been so convicted of a conspiracy or attempt to violate-
(i) any offense under chapter 37 (relating to espionage), chapter 105 (relating to sabotage), or 
chapter 115 (relating to treason and sedition) of title 18, United States Code, for which a term of 
imprisonment of five or more years may be imposed; . 
(ii) any offense under section 871 or 960 of title 18, United States Code; 
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(iii) a violation of any provision of the Military Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C. App. 451 et seq.) or 
the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 1 et seq.); or 
(iv) a violation of section 215 or 278 of this Act, is deportable. 
(E) 6/_Crimes of Domestic violence, stalking, or violation of protection order, crimes against 
children and.-
(i) Domestic violence, stalking, and child abuse.-Any alien who at any time after admission is 
convicted of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child 
neglect, or child abandonment is deportable. For purposes of this clause, the term "crime of 
domestic violence" means any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, United States 
Code) against a person committed by a current or former spouse of the person, by an individual 
with whom the person shares a child in common, by an individual who is cohabiting with or has 
cohabited with the person as a spouse, by an individual similarly situated to a spouse of the person 
under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction where the offense occurs, or by any 
other individual against a person who is protected from that individual's acts under the domestic or 
family violence laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal government, or unit of local 
government. 
(ii) Violators of protection orders.-Any alien who at any time after entry is enjoined under a 
protection order issued by a court and whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that 
violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of 
violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection 
order was issued is deportable. For purposes of this clause, the term "protection order" means any 
injunction issued fo r the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence, 
including temporary or final orders issued by civil or criminal courts (other than support or child 
custody orders or provisions) whether obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente 
lite order in another proceeding. 
(F) 13/TRAFFICKING- Any alien described in section 212(a)(2)(H) is deportable. 
(3) Failure to register and falsification of documents.-
(A) Change of address.-An alien who has failed to comply with the provisions of section 265 is 
deportable, unless the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that such failure 
was reasonably excusable or was not willful. 
(B) Failure to register or falsification of documents.- Any alien who at any time has been convicted-
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(i) under section 266(c) of this Act or under section 36(c) of the Alien Registration Act, 1940, 
(ii) of a violation of, or an attempt or a conspiracy to violate, any provision of the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.), or 
(iii) of a violation of, or an attempt or a conspiracy to violate, section 1546 of title 18, United States 
Code (relating to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other entry documents), is deportable. 
(C) 7/_Document fraud.-
(i) In general.-An alien who is the subject of a final order for violation of section 274C is deportable. 
(ii) Waiver authorized.-The Attorney General may waive clause (i) in the case of an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence if no previous civil money penalty was imposed against the alien 
under section 274C and the offense was incurred solely to assist, aid, or support the alien's spouse 
or child (and not another individual). No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the 
Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this clause. 
(D) 8^FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP-
(i) IN GENERAL- Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself to be a 
citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this Act (including section 274A) or 
any Federal or State law is deportable. 
(ii) EXCEPTION- In the case of an alien making a representation described in clause (i), if each 
natural parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adoptive parent of the alien) is 
or was a citizen (whether by birth or naturalization), the alien permanently resided in the United 
States prior to attaining the age of 16, and the alien reasonably believed at the time of making such 
representation that he or she was a citizen, the alien shall not be considered to be deportable 
under any prov ision of this subsection based on such representation. 
(4) Security and related grounds.-
(A) In general.-Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission engages in-
(i) any activity to violate any law of the United States relating to espionage or sabotage or to violate 
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or evade any law prohibiting the export from the United States of goods, technology, or sensitive 
information, 
(ii) any other criminal activity which endangers public safety or national security, or 
(iii) any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the 
Government of the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means, is deportable. 
(B) 8a/11/TERRORIST ACTIVITIES- Any alien who is described in subparagraph (B) or (F) of 
section 212(a)(3) is deportable. 
(C) Foreign policy.-
(i) In general.-An alien whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has 
reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences 
for the United States is deportable. 
(ii) Exceptions.-The exceptions described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of section 212(a)(3)(C) shall apply 
to deportability under clause (i) in the same manner as they apply to inadmissibility under section 
212(a)(3)(C)(i). 
(D) 8c/PARTICIPATED IN NAZI PERSECUTION, GENOCIDE, OR THE COMMISSION OF 
ANY ACT OF TORTURE OR EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING.-Any alien described in M d a u s e (i), 
(ii), or (iii) of section 212(a)(3)(E) is deportable. 
(E) 8b/ Repealed 
(E) 8d/ PARTICIPATED IN THE COMMISSION OF SEVERE VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM- Any alien described in section 212(a)(2)(G) is deportable. 
(F) 8e/RECRUITMENT OR USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS- Any alien who has engaged in the 
recruitment or use of child soldiers in violation of section 2442 of title 18, United States Code, is 
deportable. 
(5) Public charge.-Any alien who, within five years after the date of entry; has become a public 
charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since entry is deportable. 
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(6) ^UNLAWFUL VOTERS-
(A) IN GENERAL- Any alien who has voted in violation of any Federal, State, or local constitutional 
provision, statute, ordinance, or regulation is deportable. 
(B) EXCEPTION- In the case of an alien who voted in a Federal, State, or local election (including 
an initiative, recall, or referendum) in violation of a lawful restriction of voting to citizens, if each 
natural parent of the alien (or, in the case of an adopted alien, each adoptive parent of the alien) is 
or was a citizen (whether by birth or naturalization), the alien permanently resided in the United 
States prior to attaining the age of 16, and the alien reasonably believed at the time of such 
violation that he or she was a citizen, the alien shall not be considered to be deportable under any 
provision of this subsection based on such violation. 
(7) 9a/WAIVER FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE-
(A) IN GENERAL- The Attorney General is not limited by the criminal court record and may waive 
the application of paragraph (2)(E)(i) (with respect to crimes of domestic violence and crimes of 
stalking) and (ii) in the case of an alien who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty and 
who is not and was not the primary perpetrator of violence in the relationship-
(i) upon a determination that-
(I) the alien was acting is self-defense; 
(II) the alien was found to have violated a protection order intended to protect the alien; or 
(III) the alien committed, was arrested for, was convicted of, or pled guilty to committing a crime-
(aa) that did not result in serious bodily injury; and 
l 
(bb) where there was a connection between the crime and the alien's having been battered or 
subjected to extreme cruelty. 
( 
(B) CREDIBLE EVIDENCE CONSIDERED- In acting on applications under this paragraph, the 
Attorney General shall consider any credible evidence relevant to the application. The 
38 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within 
the sole discretion of the Attorney General. 
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INA: ACT 239 - INITIATION OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
Sec. 239. 1/_(a) Notice to Appear.-
(1) In general.-In removal proceedings under section 240 , written notice (in this section referred to 
as a "notice to appear") shall be given in person to the alien (or, if personal service is not 
practicable, through service by mail to the alien or to the alien's counsel of record, if any) specifying 
the following: 
(A) The nature of the proceedings against the alien. 
(B) The legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted. 
(C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of law. 
(D) The charges against the alien and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated. 
(E) The alien may be represented by counsel and the alien will be provided (i) a period of time to 
secure counsel under subsection (b)(1) and (ii) a current list of counsel prepared under subsection 
(b)(2). 
(F) (i) The requirement that the alien must immediately provide (or have provided) the Attorney 
General with a written record of an address and telephone number (if any) at which the alien may 
be contacted respecting proceedings under section 240 . 
(ii) The requirement that the alien must provide the Attorney General immediately with a written 
record of any change of the alien's address or telephone number. 
(iii) The consequences under section 240(b)(5) of failure to provide address and telephone 
information pursuant to this subparagraph. 
(G) (i) The time and place at which the proceedings will be held. 
(ii) The consequences under section 240(b)(5) of the failure, except under exceptional 
circumstances, to appear at such proceedings. 
(2) Notice of change in time or place of proceedings.-
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(A) In general.-In removal proceedings under section 240, in the case of any change or 
postponement in the time and place of such proceedings, subject to subparagraph (B) a written 
notice shall be given in person to the alien (or, if personal service is not practicable, through 
service by mail to the alien or to the alien's counsel of record, if any) specifying-
(i) the new time or place of the proceedings, and 
(ii) the consequences under section 240(b)(5) of failing, except under exceptional circumstances, 
to attend such proceedings. 
(B) Exception.-In the case of an alien not in detention, a written notice shall not be required under 
this paragraph if the alien has failed to provide the address required under paragraph (1)(F). 
(3) Central address files.-The Attorney General shall create a system to record and preserve on a 
timely basis notices of addresses and telephone numbers (and changes) provided under 
paragraph (1)(F). 
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INA: ACT 240 - REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
(c) Decision and Burden of Proof. -
(1) Decision.-
(A) In general.-At the conclusion of the proceeding the immigration judge shall decide whether an 
alien is removable from the United States. The determination of the immigration judge shall be 
based only on the evidence produced at the hearing. 
(B) Certain medical decisions.-If a medical officer or civil surgeon or board of medical officers has 
certified under section 232(b) that an alien has a disease, illness, or addiction which would make 
the alien inadmissible under paragraph (1) of section 212(a), the decision of the immigration judge 
shall be based solely upon such certification. 
(2) Burden on alien.-In the proceeding the alien has the burden of establishing-
(A) if the alien is an applicant for admission, that the alien is clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be 
admitted and is not inadmissible under section 212; or 
(B) by clear and convincing evidence, that the alien is lawfully present in the United States 
pursuant to a prior admission. 
In meeting the burden of proof under subparagraph (B), the alien shall have access to the alien's 
visa or other entry document, if any, and any other records and documents, not considered by the 
Attorney General to be confidential, pertaining to the alien's admission or presence in the United 
States. 
I 
( 
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INA: ACT 240A - CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL; ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS 
Sec. 240A. 1£(a) Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents.-The Attorney General 
may cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United 
States if the alien-
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, 
(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any 
status, and 
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony. 
(b) CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL AND ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS FOR CERTAIN 
NONPERMANENT RESIDENTS.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-The Attorney General 2/_may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an 
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from 
the United States if the alien-
(A) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 
years immediately preceding the date of such application; 
(B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; 
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(3), subject 
to paragraph (5) 2a/ 5/; and 
(D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the 
alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence. 
(2) ^SPECIAL RULE FOR BATTERED SPOUSE OR CHILD-
(A) AUTHORITY- The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien 
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lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the 
United States if the alien demonstrates that-
(i) (I) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent who is or was 
a United States citizen (or is the parent of a child of a United States citizen and the child has been 
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by such citizen parent); 
(II) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent who is or was a 
lawful permanent resident (or is the parent of a child of an alien who is or was a lawful permanent 
resident and the child has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by such permanent resident 
parent); or 
(III) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a United States citizen or lawful 
permanent resident whom the alien intended to marry, but whose marriage is not legitimate because 
of that United States citizen's or lawful permanent resident's bigamy; 
(ii) the alien has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 
3 years immediately preceding the date of such application, and the issuance of a charging 
document for removal proceedings shall not toll the 3-year period of continuous physical presence 
in the United States; 
(iii) the alien has been a person of good moral character during such period, subject to the provisions 
of subparagraph (C); 
(iv) the alien is not inadmissible under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 212(a), is not deportable 
under paragraphs (1)(G) or (2) through (4) of section 237(a), 5/_, subject to paragraph (5) and has 
not been convicted of an aggravated felony; and i 
(v) the removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien, the alien's child, or the alien's parent. 
(B) PHYSICAL PRESENCE- Notwithstanding subsection (d)(2), for purposes of subparagraph 
(A)(ii) 6/or for purposes of section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title III-A effective date in 
section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996), an alien 
shall not be considered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence by reason of an 
absence if the alien demonstrates a connection between the absence and the battering or extreme 
cruelty perpetrated against the alien. No absence or portion of an absence connected to the battering 
or extreme cruelty shall co unt toward the 90-day or 180-day limits established in subsection (d)(2). 
If any absence or aggregate absences exceed 180 days, the absences or portions of the absences will 
44 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not be considered to break the period of continuous presence. Any such period of time excluded 
from the 180-day limit shall be excluded in computing the time during which the alien has been 
physically present for purposes of the 3-year requirement set forth in section 240A(b)(2)(B) and 
section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title III-A effective date in section 309 of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996). 
(C) GOOD MORAL CHARACTER- Notwithstanding section 101(f), an act or conviction that 
does not bar the Attorney General from granting relief under this paragraph by reason of 
subparagraph (A)(iv) shall not bar the Attorney General from finding the alien to be of good moral 
character under subparagraph 6/ (A)(iii) or section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title III-A 
effective date in section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996), if the Attorney General finds that the act or conviction was connected to the alien's having 
been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty and determines that a waiver is otherwise warranted. 
(D) CREDIBLE EVIDENCE CONSIDERED- In acting on applications under this paragraph, the 
Attorney General shall consider any credible evidence relevant to the application. The 
determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within 
the sole discretion of the Attorney General. 
(3) RECORDATION OF DATE. 3/_--With respect to aliens who the Attorney General adjusts to the 
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence under paragraph (1) or (2), the 
Attorney General shall record the alien's lawful admission for permanent residence as of the date 
of the Attorney General's cancellation of removal under paragraph (1) or (2). 
(4) 3a/CHILDREN OF BATTERED ALIENS AND PARENTS OF BATTERED ALIEN CHILDREN-
(A) IN GENERAL- The Attorney General shall grant parole under section 212(d)(5) to any alien 
who is a -
(i) child of an alien granted relief under section 240A(b)(2) or 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title 
lll-A effective date in section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996); or 
(ii) parent of a child alien granted relief under section 240A(b)(2) or 244(a)(3) (as in effect before 
the title lll-A effective date in section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996). 
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(B) DURATION OF PAROLE- The grant of parole shall extend from the time of the grant of relief 
under section 240A(b)(2) or section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title III-A effective date in 
section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996) to the 
time the application for adjustment of status filed by aliens covered under this paragraph has been 
finally adjudicated. Applications for adjustment of status filed by aliens covered under this 
paragraph shall be treated as if the applicants were VAWA self-petitioners. 5a/ Failure by the alien 
granted relief under section 240A(b)(2) or section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the title III-A 
effective date in section 309 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996) to exercise due diligence in filing a visa petition on behalf of an alien described in clause (i) 
or (ii) may result in revocation of parole. 
(5) 5/.APPLICATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WAIVER AUTHORITY- The authority 
provided under section 237(a)(7) may apply under paragraphs (1)(B), (1)(C), and (2)(A)(iv) in a 
cancellation of removal and adjustment of status proceeding. 
(6) 7/ .RELATIVES O F TRAFFICKING VICTIMS-
(A) IN G E N E R A L - Upon written request by a law enforcement official, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security may parole under section 212(d)(5) any alien who is a relative of an alien granted 
continued presence under section 107(c)(3)(A) o f t he Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. 
7105(c)(3)(A)), if the relative-
(i) was, on the date on which law enforcement applied for such continued presence-
(I) in the case of an alien granted continued presence who is under 21 years of age, the spouse, 
child, parent, or unmarried sibling under 18 years of age, of the alien; or 
(II) in the case of an alien granted continued presence who is 21 years of age or older, the spouse 
or child of the alien; or 
(ii) is a parent or sibling of the alien who the requesting law enforcement official, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, as appropriate, determines to be in present danger of 
retaliation as a result of the alien's escape from the severe form of trafficking or cooperation with 
law enforcement, irrespective of age. 
(B) DURATION OF P A R O L E -
(i) IN G E N E R A L - The Secretary may extend the parole granted under subparagraph (A) until the 
final adjudication of the application filed by the principal alien under section 101(a)(15)(T)(ii).
 { 
(ii) O T H E R LIMITS O N DURATION- If an application described in clause (i) is not filed, the parole 
granted under subparagraph (A) may extend until the later of -
(I) the date on which the principal alien's authority to remain in the United States under section 
107(c)(3)(A) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. 7105(c)(3)(A)) is terminated; or 
(II) the date on which a civil action filed by the principal alien under section 1595 of title 18, United 
States Code, is concluded. i 
(iii) DUE DILIGENCE- Failure by the principal alien to exercise due diligence in filing a visa petition 
on behalf of an alien described in clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A), or in pursuing the civil 
action described in clause (ii)(ll) (as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security in 
consultation with the Attorney General), may result in revocation of parole. 
(C) OTHER LIMITATIONS- A relative may not be granted parole under this paragraph if-
(i) the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General has reason to believe that the * 
relative was knowingly complicit in the trafficking of an alien permitted to remain in the United 
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States under section 107(c)(3)(A) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. 
7105(c)(3)(A)); or 
(ii) the relative is an alien described in paragraph (2) or (3) of section 212(a) or paragraph (2) or (4) 
of section 237(a). 
(c) Aliens Ineligible for Relief.-The provisions of subsections (a) and (b)(1) shall not apply to any of 
the following aliens: 
(1) An alien who entered the United States as a crewman subsequent to June 30, 1964. 
(2) An alien who was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined 
in section 101(a)(15)(J), or has acquired the status of such a nonimmigrant exchange alien after 
admission, in order to receive graduate medical education or training, regardless of whether or not 
the alien is subject to or has fulfilled the two-year foreign residence requirement of section 212(e). 
(3) An alien who-
(A) was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined in section 
101(a)(15)(J) or has acquired the status of such a nonimmigrant exchange alien after admission 
other than to receive graduate medical education or training, 
(B) is subject to the two-year foreign residence requirement of section 212(e), and 
(C) has not fulfilled that requirement or received a waiver thereof. 
(4) An alien who is inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) or deportable under of section 237(a)(4). 
(5) An alien who is described in section 241(b)(3)(B)(i). 
(6) An alien whose removal has previously been canceled under this section or whose deportation 
was suspended under section 244(a) or who has been granted relief under section 212(c), as 
such sections were in effect before the date of the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. 
(d) Special Rules Relating to Continuous Residence or Physical Presence.-
(1) TERMINATION OF CONTINUOUS PERIOD.- For purposes of this section, any period of 
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continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end 
3b/ (A) except in the case of an alien who applies for cancellation of removal under subsection 
(b)(2), when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 239(a), or (B) when the alien has 
committed an offense referred to in section 212(a)(2) that renders the alien inadmissible to the 
United States under section 212(a)(2) or removable from the United States under section 237(a)(2) 
or 237(a)(4), whichever is earliest. 
(2) Treatment of certain breaks in presence.-An alien shall be considered to have failed to maintain 
continuous physical presence in the United States under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) if the alien 
has departed from the United States for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the 
aggregate exceeding 180 days. 
(3) Continuity not required because of honorable service in armed forces and presence upon entry 
into service.-The requirements of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the 
United States under subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to an alien who-
(A) has served for a minimum period of 24 months in an active-duty status in the Armed Forces of 
the United States and, if separated from such service, was separated under honorable conditions, 
and 
(B) at the time of the alien's enlistment or induction was in the United States. 
(e) ANNUAL LIMITATION. 4/_~ 
(1) AGGREGATE LIMITATION.-Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Attorney General may not 
cancel the removal and adjust the status under this section, nor suspend the deportation and 
adjust the status under section 244(a) (as in effect before the enactment of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996), of a total of more than 4,000 aliens in any fiscal 
year. The previous sentence shall apply regardless of when an alien applied for such cancellation 
and adjustment, or such suspension and adjustment, and whether such an alien had previously 
applied for suspension of deportation under such section 244(a). The numerical limitation under 
this paragraph shall apply to the aggregate number of decisions in any fiscal year to cancel the 
removal (and adjust the status) of an alien, or suspend the deportation (and adjust the status) of an 
alien, under this section or such section 244(a). 
i 
(2) FISCAL YEAR 1997.-For fiscal year 1997, paragraph (1) shall only apply to decisions to cancel 
the removal of an alien, or suspend the deportation of an alien, made after April 1, 1997. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General may cancel the removal or 
suspend the deportation, in addition to the normal allotment for fiscal year 1998, of a number of 
aliens equal to 4,000 less the number of such cancellations of removal and suspensions of 
deportation granted in fiscal year 1997 a fter April 1, 1997. 
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(3) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN ALIENS.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the following: 
(A) Aliens described in section 309(c)(5)(C)(i) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (as amended by the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American 
Relief Act). 
(B) Aliens in deportation proceedings prior to April 1, 1997, who applied for suspension of 
deportation under section 244(a)(3) (as in effect before the date of the enactment of the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996). 
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JUDGES: Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Roberts, C. J., 
joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. 
OPINION BY: STEVENS 
OPINION 
Justice Stevens delivered [***6] the opinion of the Court. 
Petitioner Jose Padilla, a native of Honduras, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United 
States for more than 40 years. Padilla served [**290] this Nation with honor as a member of the U. S. 
Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. He now faces deportation after pleading guilty to the 
transportation of a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.1 
1 Padilla's crime, like virtually every drug offense except for only the most insignificant 
marijuana offenses, is a deportable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
[*1478] In this postconviction proceeding, Padilla claims that his counsel not only failed to advise 
him of this consequence prior to his entering the plea, but also told him that he " 'did not have to worry 
about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.1 " 253 S. W. 3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008). 
Padilla relied on his counsel's erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his 
deportation virtually mandatory. He alleges that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had not 
received incorrect advice from his attorney. 
Assuming the truth of his allegations, the Supreme Court of Kentucky [***7] denied Padilla 
postconviction relief without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the Sixth 
Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from 
erroneous advice about deportation because it is merely a "collateral" consequence of his conviction. Id., 
at 485. In its view, neither counsel's failure to advise petitioner about the possibility of removal, nor 
counsel's incorrect advice, could provide a basis for relief. 
We granted certiorari, 555 U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 1317, 173 L. Ed. 2d 582 (2009), to decide whether, as 
a matter of federal law, Padilla's counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was 
pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country. We agree with Padilla that constitutionally 
competent counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to 
automatic deportation. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a 
matter that we do not address. 
The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the last 90 years. While 
once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary 
authority [***8] to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of 
deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. 
The "drastic measure" of deportation or removal, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S. Ct. 374, 
92 L. Ed. 433 (1948), is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes. 
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The Nation's first 100 years was Ma period of unimpeded immigration." C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, 
Immigration Law and Procedure § l.(2)(a), p. 5 (1959). An early effort to empower the President to order 
the deportation of those immigrants he "judge[d] dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States," 
Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 571, was short lived and unpopular. Gordon § 1.2, at 5. It was not 
until 1875 that Congress first passed a statute barring convicts and prostitutes from entering the country, 
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. Gordon § 1.2b, at 6. In 1891, Congress added to the list of 
excludable persons those "who have been [**291] convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.2 
2 In 1907, Congress expanded the class [***9] of excluded persons to include individuals who 
"admit" to having committed a crime of moral turpitude. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 
899. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 (1917 Act) brought "radical changes" [*1479] to our 
law. S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 54-55 (1950). For the first time in our history, Congress 
made classes of noncitizens deportable based on conduct committed on American soil, id , at 55. Section 
19 of the 1917 Act authorized the deportation of "any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment 
for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, 
committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States . . . ." 39 Stat. 889. And § 19 
also rendered deportable noncitizen recidivists who commit two or more crimes of moral turpitude at any 
time after entry. Ibid. Congress did not, however, define the term "moral turpitude." 
While the 1917 Act was "radical" because it authorized deportation as a consequence of certain 
convictions, the Act also included a critically important procedural protection to minimize the risk of 
unjust deportation: At the time of sentencing [***10] or within 30 days thereafter, the sentencing judge 
in both state and federal prosecutions had the power to make a recommendation "that such alien shall not 
be deported." Id., at 890.3 This procedure, known as a judicial recommendation against deportation, or 
JRAD, had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute was "consistently . . . 
interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction 
should be disregarded as a basis for deportation," Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (CA2 1986). 
Thus, from 1917 forward, there was no such creature as an automatically deportable offense. Even as the 
class of deportable offenses expanded, judges retained discretion to ameliorate unjust results on a case-
by-case basis. 
3 As enacted, the statute provided: 
"That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned, nor shall such deportation 
be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing such alien for such crime shall, at the 
time of imposing judgment or passing sentence or within thirty days [***11] thereafter, . . . make 
a recommendation to the Secretary of Labor that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of 
this Act." 1917 Act, 39 Stat. 889-890. 
This provision was codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994 ed.) (transferred to § 1227 (2006 
ed.)). The judge's nondeportation recommendation was binding on the Secretary of Labor and, 
later, the Attorney General after control of immigration removal matters was transferred from the 
former to the latter. See Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (CA2 1986). 
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Although narcotics offenses-such as the offense at issue in this case-provided a distinct basis for 
deportation as early as 1922/ the JRAD procedure was generally available [**292] to avoid deportation 
in narcotics convictions. See United States v. O'Ronrke, 213 F.2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954). Except for 
"technical, inadvertent and insignificant violations of the laws relating to narcotics," ibid., it appears that 
courts treated narcotics offenses as crimes involving [* 1480] moral turpitude for purposes of the 1917 
Act's broad JRAD provision. See ibid, (recognizing that until 1952 a JRAD in a narcotics case "was 
effective to prevent deportation" (citing Dang Nam v. Bryan, 74 F.2d 379, 380-381 (CA9 1934))). 
4 Congress [***12] first identified narcotics offenses as a special category of crimes triggering 
deportation in the 1922 Narcotic Drug Act. Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596. After the 
1922 Act took effect, there was some initial confusion over whether a narcotics offense also had to 
be a crime of moral turpitude for an individual to be deportable. See Weedin v. Moy Fat, 8 F.2d 
488, 489 (CA9 1925) (holding that an individual who committed narcotics offense was not 
deportable because offense did not involve moral turpitude). However, lower courts eventually 
agreed that the narcotics offense provision was "special," Chung Que Fong v. Nagle, 15 F.2d 789, 
790 (CA9 1926); thus, a narcotics offense did not need also to be a crime of moral turpitude (or to 
satisfy other requirements of the 1917 Act) to trigger deportation. See United States ex rel 
Grimaldi v. Ebey, 12 F2d 922, 923 (CA7 1926); Todaro v. Munster, 62 F.2d 963, 964 (CA10 
1933). 
In light of both the steady expansion of deportable offenses and the significant ameliorative effect of 
a JRAD, it is unsurprising that, in the wake of Strickland v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the Second Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective [***13] 
assistance of counsel applies to a JRAD request or lack thereof, see Janvier, 793 F.2d 449. See also
 ( 
United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557 (CA5 1994). In its view, seeking a JRAD was "part of the 
sentencing" process, Janvier, 793 F.2d, at 452, even if deportation itself is a civil action. Under the 
Second Circuit's reasoning, the impact of a conviction on a noncitizen's ability to remain in the country 
was a central issue to be resolved during the sentencing process—not merely a collateral matter outside the 
scope of counsel's duty to provide effective representation. 
i 
However, the JRAD procedure is no longer part of our law. Congress first circumscribed the JRAD 
provision in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),5 and in 1990 Congress entirely eliminated 
it, 104 Stat. 5050. In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General's authority to grant 
discretionary relief from deportation, 110 Stat. 3009-596, an authority that had been exercised to prevent 
the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the 5-year period prior to 1996, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 US. 
289, 296, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2001). Under contemporary law, [HNl] [**LEdHRl] [1] if < 
a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the 1996 effective [***14] date of these 
amendments, his removal is practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of 
equitable discretion vested in the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of 
particular classes of offenses.6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Subject to limited exceptions, this discretionary 
relief is not available for an offense related to trafficking in a controlled substance. See § 1101 (a)(43)(B); 
§ 1228. ( 
5 The Act separately codified the moral turpitude offense provision and the narcotics offense 
provision within 8 U.S.C § 1251(a) (1994 ed.) under subsections (a)(4) and (a)(ll), respectively. 
See 66 Stat. 201, 204, 206. The JRAD procedure, codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994 ed), 
applied only to the "provisions of subsection (a)(4)," the crimes-of-moral-turpitude provision. 66 
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Stat. 208; see United States v. O'Rourke, 213 F.2d 759, 762 (CA8 1954) (recognizing that, under 
the 1952 Act, narcotics offenses were no longer eligible for JRADs). 
6 The changes to our immigration law have also involved a change in nomenclature; the statutory 
text now uses the term "removal" rather than "deportation." See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 
348, 350, n. 1, 121 S. Ct. 2268, 150 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2001). 
These [***15] changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's 
criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of [**293] crimes 
has never been more important. These changes confirm our view that, [HN2] [**LEdHR2] [2] as a 
matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part7 -of the 
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. 
7 See Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 12-27 (providing real-world 
examples). 
II 
[HN3] [**LEdHR3] [3] Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the 
effective [*1481] assistance of competent counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 
1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); Strickland, 466 US, at 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The 
Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla's ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he 
sought about the risk of deportation concerned only collateral matters, i.e., those matters not within the 
sentencing authority of the state trial court.8 253 S. W. 3d, at 483-484 (citing Commonwealth v. Fuartado, 
170 S. W. 3d 384 (2005)). In its view, "collateral consequences are outside the scope of representation 
required by the Sixth Amendment" [***16] and, therefore, the "failure of defense counsel to advise the 
defendant of possible deportation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of 
counsel." 253 S. W. 3d, at 483. The Kentucky high court is far from alone in this view.9 
8 There is some disagreement among the courts over how to distinguish between direct and 
collateral consequences. See Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, 
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 124, n. 15 (2009). 
The disagreement over how to apply the direct/collateral distinction has no bearing on the 
disposition of this case because, as even Justice Alito agrees, counsel must, at the very least, advise 
a noncitizen "defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences," 
post, at , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 299 (opinion concurring in judgment). See also post, at , 176 L. 
Ed. 2d, at 307 ("I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does no more than require 
defense counsel to avoid misinformation"). In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito has thus 
departed from the strict rule applied by the Supreme Court of Kentucky and in the two federal 
cases that he cites, post, at , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 300. 
9 See, e.g., [***17] United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (CA1 2000); United States v. Del 
Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 284 US App. D.C 90 (CADC 1990); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 
6 (CA4 1988); Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327 (CA5 2008); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 
358 F.3d 1251 (CA10 2004); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (CA11 1985); Oyekoya v. 
State, 558 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Rosas, 183 Ariz. 421, 904 P.2d 1245 
(App. 1995); State v. Montalban, 2000-2739 (La. 2/26/02), 810 So. 2d 1106; Commonwealth v. 
Frometa, 520 Pa. 552, 555A.2d92 (1989). 
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We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define 
the scope of constitutionally "reasonable professional assistance" required under Strickland, 466 U.S., at 
689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not 
consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation. 
We have long recognized that [HN4] [**LEdHR4] [4] deportation is a particularly severe "penalty," 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905 (1893); but it is not, in a 
strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, see INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. Ed 2d 778 (1984), deportation [***18] is 
nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and 
the penalty of deportation [**294] for nearly a century, see Part I, supra, at - , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 
290-293. And, importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly an 
automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it "most difficult" to divorce the 
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38, 222 U.S. 
App. D.C. 313 (CADC 1982). Moreover, we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of 
deportation for a particular offense find it even more difficult. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 322, 121 S. Ct. 
2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 ("There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering 
whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the [*1482] immigration consequences of 
their convictions"). 
[HN5] [**LEdHR5] [5] Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its 
close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral 
consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim 
concerning the specific risk of deportation. We conclude that [***19] advice regarding deportation is not 
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. StricklandappliQS to 
Padilla's claim. 
Ill 
[HN6] [**LEdHR6] [6] Under Strickland, we first determine whether counsel's representation "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness." 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Then 
we ask whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
 ( 
the proceeding would have been different." Id, at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. The first prong-
-constitutional deficiency—is necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community: 
"The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms." Id, at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. We long have recognized that 
"[prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are 
guides to determining what is reasonable . . . ." Ibid.;Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. , , 130 S. Ct. ( 
13, 175 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2009) (per curiam); Florida v. Nixon, 543 US. 175, 191, and n. 6, 125 S. Ct. 551, 
160 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2004); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 
(2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). Although they 
are "only guides," Strickland, 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, and [***20] not 
"inexorable commands," Bobby, 558 U.S., at , 130 S. Ct. 13, 175 L. Ed. 2d 255, these standards may 
be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation, especially as these ' 
standards have been adapted to deal with the intersection of modern criminal prosecutions and 
immigration law. 
The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that [HN7] [**LEdHR7] [7] counsel 
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation. National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., 
Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation § 6.2 (1995); G. Herman, Plea Bargaining § 3.03, 
pp. 20-21 (1997); Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty 
Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 713-718 (2002); A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing [**295] § 13:23, pp. 
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555, 560 (3d ed. 2004); Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2 Compendium of Standards for 
Indigent Defense Systems, Standards for Attorney Performance, pp. D10, H8-H9, J8 (2000) (providing 
survey of guidelines across multiple jurisdictions); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution 
Function and Defense Function 4-5.1(a), p. 197 (3d ed. 1993); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas 
of Guilty 14-3.2(f), p. 116 (3d [***21] ed. 1999). "[Authorities of every stripe-including the American 
Bar Association, criminal defense and public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and 
city bar publications-universally require defense attorneys to advise as to the risk of deportation 
consequences for non-citizen clients . . . ." Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and Criminal Law 
Professors asAmici Curiae 12-14 (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, National Legal Aid and Defender 
Assn., Guidelines, supra, §§ 6.2-6.4 (1997); S. Bratton & E. Kelley, Practice Points: Representing a 
Noncitizen in a Criminal Case, 31 The Champion 61 (Jan./Feb. 2007); N. Tooby, Criminal Defense of 
Immigrants [*1483] § 1.3 (3d ed. 2003); 2 Criminal Practice Manual §§ 45:3, 45:15 (2009)). 
We too have previously recognized that" '[preserving the client's right to remain in the United States 
may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.'" St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 323, 121 S. Ct. 
2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (quoting 3 Criminal Defense Techniques §§ 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999)). 
Likewise, we have recognized that "preserving the possibility o f discretionary relief from deportation 
under § 212(c) of the 1952 INA, 66 Stat. 187, repealed [***22] by Congress in 1996, "would have been 
one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to 
proceed to trial." St Cyr, 533 U.S., at 323, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347. We expected that counsel 
who were unaware of the discretionary relief measures would "follo[w] the advice of numerous practice 
guides" to advise themselves of the importance of this particular form of discretionary relief. Ibid., n. 50. 
In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and explicit in 
defining the removal consequence for Padilla's conviction. See 8 US.C § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) ([HN8] 
[**LEdHR8] [8] "Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a 
conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use 
of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable"). Padilla's counsel could have easily determined that his 
plea would make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, which addresses 
not some broad classification of crimes but specifically commands [***23] removal for all controlled 
substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Instead, Padilla's 
counsel provided him false assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this 
country. This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla's plea could 
easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively mandatory, and 
his counsel's advice was incorrect. 
Immigration law can be complex, [**296] and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of 
the bar who represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be 
well versed in it. There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation 
consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private practitioner in such 
cases is more limited. [HN9] [**LEdHR9] [9] When the law is not succinct and straightforward (as it is 
in many of the scenarios posited by Justice Alito), a criminal defense attorney need do no more than 
advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences.10 But when the deportation consequence [***24] is truly clear, as it was in this case, the 
duty to give correct advice is equally clear. 
10 As Justice Alito explains at length, deportation consequences are often unclear. Lack of clarity 
in the law, however, does not obviate the need for counsel to say something about the possibility of 
deportation, even though it will affect the scope and nature of counsel's advice. 
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Accepting his allegations as true, Padilla has sufficiently alleged constitutional deficiency to satisfy 
the first prong of Strickland. Whether Padilla is entitled to relief on his claim will depend on whether he 
can satisfy Strickland s second prong, prejudice, [*1484] a matter we leave to the Kentucky courts to 
consider in the first instance. 
IV 
The Solicitor General has urged us to conclude that Strickland applies to Padilla's claim only to the 
extent that he has alleged affirmative misadvice. In the United States' view, "counsel is not 
constitutionally required to provide advice on matters that will not be decided in the criminal case . . . ," 
though counsel is required to provide accurate advice if she chooses to discusses these matters. Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 10. 
Respondent and Padilla both find the Solicitor [***25] General's proposed rule unpersuasive, 
although it has support among the lower courts. See, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179, 188 (CA2 
2002); United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (CA9 2005); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882 (CA6 1988); 
United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 222 US App. D.C 313 (CADC 1982); State v. Rojas-Martinez, 
2005 UT86, 125 P. 3d 930, 935; In re Resendiz, 25 Cal. 4th 230, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 19 P. 3d 1171 
(2001). Kentucky describes these decisions isolating an affirmative misadvice claim as "result-driven, 
incestuous . . . [,and] completely lacking in legal or rational bases." Brief for Respondent 31. We do not 
share that view, but we agree that there is no relevant difference "between an act of commission and an 
act of omission" in this context. Id, at 30; Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
("The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions 
were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance"); see also State v. Paredez, 2004-
NMSC-036, 2004NMSC36, 136 N. M. 533, 538-539, 101 P.3d 799. 
A holding limited to affirmative misadvice would invite two absurd results. First, it would give 
counsel an incentive to remain silent on matters of great importance, even [***26] when answers are 
readily available. Silence under these circumstances would be fundamentally at odds with the critical 
obligation of counsel to advise the client of "the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement." 
Libretti [**297] v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51, 116 S Ct. 356, 133 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1995). When 
attorneys know that their clients face possible exile from this country and separation from their families, 
they should not be encouraged to say nothing at all.11 Second, it would deny a class of clients least able to 
represent themselves the most rudimentary advice on deportation even when it is readily available. 
[HN10] [**LEdHR10] [10] It is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with available 
advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so "clearly satisfies the first prong of the 
Strickland analysis:' Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985) (White, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
11 As the Commonwealth conceded at oral argument, were a defendant's lawyer to know that a 
particular offense would result in the client's deportation and that, upon deportation, the client and 
his family might well be killed due to circumstances in the client's home country, any decent 
attorney would inform the client [***27] of the consequences of his plea. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37-38. 
We think the same result should follow when the stakes are not life and death but merely 
"banishment or exile," Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 390-391, 68 S. Ct. 10, 92 L. Ed. 17 
(1947). 
We have given serious consideration to the concerns that the Solicitor General, respondent, and amici 
have stressed regarding the importance of protecting the finality of convictions obtained through guilty 
pleas. We confronted a similar "floodgates" concern in Hill, see id., at 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 
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203, but nevertheless applied [*1485] Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client 
regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty.12 
12 However, we concluded that, even though Strickland applied to petitioner's claim, he had not 
sufficiently alleged prejudice to satisfy Strickland^ second prong. Hill, 474 U.S., at 59-60, 106 S. 
Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203. This disposition further underscores the fact that it is often quite difficult 
for petitioners who have acknowledged their guilt to satisfy Strickland^ prejudice prong. 
Justice Alito believes that the Court misreads Hill, post, at - , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 305. In 
Hill, the Court recognized-for the first time-that Strickland applies to advice respecting a guilty 
plea. [***28] 474 U.S., at 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 ("We hold, therefore, that the two-
part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel"). It is true that Hill does not control the question before us. But its import is 
nevertheless clear. Whether Strickland applies to Padilla's claim follows from Hill, regardless of 
the fact that the Hill Court did not resolve the particular question respecting misadvice that was 
before it. 
A flood did not follow in that decision's wake. Surmounting Strickland^ high bar is never an easy 
task. See, e.g., 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 ([HN11] [**LEdHRl 1] [11] "Judicial 
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential"); id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 
674 (observing that "[a]ttorney errors . . . are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they 
are to be prejudicial"). Moreover, [HN12] [**LEdHR12] [12] to obtain relief on this type of claim, a 
petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational 
under the circumstances. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 US. 470, 480, 486, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 145 L. Ed. 
2d 985 (2000). There is no reason to doubt that lower courts—now quite experienced with applying 
Strickland—can effectively and efficiently use its framework to separate [***29] specious claims from 
those with substantial merit. 
It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already 
obtained as the result of plea bargains. For at [**298] least the past 15 years, professional norms have 
generally imposed an obligation on counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a 
client's plea. See, supra, at - , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 295-296. We should, therefore, presume that 
counsel satisfied their obligation to render competent advice at the time their clients considered pleading 
guilty. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. 
Likewise, although we must be especially careful about recognizing new grounds for attacking the 
validity of guilty pleas, in the 25 years since we first applied Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance 
at the plea stage, practice has shown that pleas are less frequently the subject of collateral challenges than 
convictions obtained after a trial. Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions.13 But they 
account for only approximately 30% of the habeas petitions filed.14 The nature of relief secured by a 
successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea—an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial 
[***30] -imposes its own significant limiting principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas 
lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, a different calculus informs [*1486] 
whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas proceeding because, ultimately, the challenge may 
result in a less favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a conviction 
obtained after a jury trial has no similar downside potential. 
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13 See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 
2003, p. 418 (31st ed. 2005) (Table 5.17) (only approximately 5%, or 8,612 out of 68,533, of 
federal criminal prosecutions go to trial); id., at 450 (Table 5.46) (only approximately 5% of all 
state felony criminal prosecutions go to trial). 
14 See V. Flango, National Center for State Courts, Habeas Corpus in State and Federal Courts 
36-38 (1994) (demonstrating that 5% of defendants whose conviction was the result of a trial 
account for approximately 70% of the habeas petitions filed). 
Finally, informed consideration of possible deportation can only benefit both the State and noncitizen 
defendants during the plea-bargaining process. [***31] By bringing deportation consequences into this 
process, the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests 
of both parties. As in this case, a criminal episode may provide the basis for multiple charges, of which 
only a subset mandate deportation following conviction. Counsel who possess the most rudimentary 
understanding of the deportation consequences of a particular criminal offense may be able to plea 
bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the 
likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the 
removal consequence. At the same time, the threat of deportation may provide the defendant with a 
powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a 
dismissal of a charge that does. 
In sum, we have long recognized that [HN13] [**LEdHR13] [13] the negotiation of a plea bargain is 
a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Hill, 474 U.S., at 57, 106 S Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d203; see also Richardson, 397 US, at 770-771, 771, 90 
S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763. The severity of deportation—"the equivalent of [**299] banishment 
[***32] or exile," Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 US 388, 390-391, 68 S. Ct. 10, 92 L. Ed. 17 (1947) -
only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of 
deportation.15 
15 To this end, we find it significant that the plea form currently used in Kentucky courts 
provides notice of possible immigration consequences. Ky. Admin. Office of Courts, Motion to 
Enter Guilty Plea, Form AOC-491 (Rev. 2/2003), http://courts.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/55ElF54E-
ED5C-4A30-BlD5-4C43C7ADD63C/0/491.pdf (as visited Mar. 29, 2010, and available in Clerk 
of Court's case file). Further, many States require trial courts to advise defendants of possible 
immigration consequences. See, e.g., Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3)(C) (2009-2010); Cal. Penal 
Code Ann. § 1016.5 (West 2008); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-Ij (2009); D. C. Code § 16-713 (2001); 
Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.172(c)(8) (Supp. 2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-93(c) (1997); Haw. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 802E-2 (2007); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 2.8(2)(b)(3) (Supp. 2009); Md. Rule 4-242 
(Lexis 2009); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 278, § 29D (2009); Minn. Rule Crim. Proc. 15.01 (2009); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-12-210 (2009); N. M. Rule Crim. Form 9-406 (2009); N. Y. Crim. Proc. 
Law Ann. §220.50(7) [***33] (West Supp. 2009); N. C Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1022 (Lexis 2007); 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2943.031 (West 2006); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 135.385 (2007); R. I. Gen. Laws § 
12-12-22 (Lexis Supp. 2008); Tex. Code. Ann. Crim. Proc, Art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2009); 
Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6565(c)(1) (Supp. 2009); Wash. Rev. Code § 10.40.200 (2008); Wis. Stat. § 
971.08(2005-2006). 
[HN14] [**LEdHR14] [14] It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal 
defendant-whether a citizen or not-is left to the "mercies of incompetent counsel." Richardson, 397 
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U.S., at 771, 90 S Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed 2d 763. To satisfy this responsibility, we now hold that counsel 
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding Sixth Amendment 
precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant 
impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no less. 
Taking as true the basis for his motion for postconviction relief, we have little difficulty [*1487] 
concluding that Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether 
Padilla is entitled to relief will depend on whether he can demonstrate prejudice as [***34] a result 
thereof, a question we do not reach because it was not passed on below. See Verizon Communs., Inc. v. 
FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 530, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 152 L. Ed. 2d 701 (2002). 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Kentucky is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
CONCUR BY: ALITO 
CONCUR 
Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice joins, concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment because a criminal defense attorney fails to provide effective assistance 
within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), 
if the attorney misleads a noncitizen client regarding the removal consequences of a conviction. In my 
view, such an attorney must (1) refrain from unreasonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the 
defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, if the alien 
wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an immigration attorney. I do not agree with the Court 
that the attorney must attempt [**300] to explain what those consequences may be. As the Court 
concedes, M[i]mmigration law can be complex"; "it is a legal specialty of its own"; and "[s]ome members 
of the bar who represent clients facing [***35] criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, 
may not be well versed in it." Ante, at , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 295. The Court nevertheless holds that a 
criminal defense attorney must provide advice in this specialized area in those cases in which the law is 
"succinct and straightforward"—but not, perhaps, in other situations. Ante, at - , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 
296. This vague, halfway test will lead to much confusion and needless litigation. 
I 
Under Strickland, an attorney provides ineffective assistance if the attorney's representation does not 
meet reasonable professional standards. 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674. Until today, 
the longstanding and unanimous position of the federal courts was that reasonable defense counsel 
generally need only advise a client about the direct consequences of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., 
United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 28 (CAl 2000) (ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails if 
"based on an attorney's failure to advise a client of his plea's immigration consequences"); United States 
v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 355 (CA5 1993) (holding that "an [***36] attorney's failure to advise a client that 
deportation is a possible consequence of a guilty plea does not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel"); see generally Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty 
Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 699 (2002) (hereinafter Chin & Holmes) (noting that "virtually all 
jurisdictions"--including "eleven federal circuits, more than thirty states, and the District of Columbia"--
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"hold that defense counsel need not discuss with their clients the collateral consequences of a conviction," 
including deportation). While the line between "direct" and "collateral" consequences is not always clear, 
see ante, at , n. 8, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 293, the collateral-consequences rule expresses an important truth: 
Criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding the conduct of criminal proceedings. They are not 
expected to possess-and very often do not possess-expertise in other areas of the law, and it is unrealistic 
to expect them to provide expert advice on [*1488] matters that lie outside their area of training and 
experience. 
This case happens to involve removal, but criminal convictions can carry a wide variety of 
consequences other than conviction [***37] and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, 
the loss of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, 
dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. Chin & 
Holmes 705-706. A criminal conviction may also severely damage a defendant's reputation and thus 
impair the defendant's ability to obtain future employment or business opportunities. All of those 
consequences are "seriou[s],M see ante, at , 176 L Ed. 2d, at 299, but this Court has never held that a 
criminal defense attorney's Sixth Amendment duties extend to providing advice about such matters. 
The Court tries to justify its dramatic departure from precedent by pointing to the views of various 
professional organizations. See ante, at , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 289 ("The weight of prevailing professional 
[**301] norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation"). 
However, ascertaining the level of professional competence required by the Sixth Amendment is 
ultimately a task for the courts. E.g., Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 145 L. Ed. 
2d 985 (2000). Although we may appropriately consult standards promulgated by private bar groups, we 
cannot [***38] delegate to these groups our task of determining what the Constitution commands. See 
Strickland, supra, at 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (explaining that "[prevailing norms of 
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards . . . are guides to determining what is 
reasonable, but they are only guides"). And we must recognize that such standards may represent only the 
aspirations of a bar group rather than an empirical assessment of actual practice. 
Even if the only relevant consideration were "prevailing professional norms," it is hard to see how 
those norms can support the duty the Court today imposes on defense counsel. Because many criminal 
defense attorneys have little understanding of immigration law, see ante, at , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 295, it 
should follow that a criminal defense attorney who refrains from providing immigration advice does not 
violate prevailing professional norms. But the Court's opinion would not just require defense counsel to 
warn the client of a general risk of removal; it would also require counsel in at least some cases, to 
specify what the removal consequences of a conviction would be. See ante, at - , 776 L. Ed. 2d, at 
296. 
The Court's new approach is particularly problematic because providing advice on whether [***39] a 
conviction for a particular offense will make an alien removable is often quite complex. "Most crimes 
affecting immigration status are not specifically mentioned by the [Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA)], but instead fall under a broad category of crimes, such as crimes involving moral turpitude or 
aggravated felonies." M. Garcia & L. Eig, CRS Report for Congress, Immigration Consequences of 
Criminal Activity (Sept. 20, 2006) (summary) (emphasis in original). As has been widely acknowledged, 
determining whether a particular crime is an "aggravated felony" or a "crime involving moral turpitude 
[(CIMT)]" is not an easy task. See R. McWhirter, ABA, The Criminal Lawyer's Guide to Immigration 
Law: Questions and Answers 128 (2d ed. 2006) (hereinafter ABA Guidebook) ("Because of the increased 
complexity of aggravated felony law, this edition devotes a new [30-page] chapter to the subject"); id., § 
5.2, at 146 (stating that the aggravated felony list at 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43) is not clear [*1489] with 
respect to several of the listed categories, that "the term 'aggravated felonies' can include misdemeanors," 
and that the determination of whether a crime is an "aggravated felony" is made "even [***40] more 
difficult" because "several agencies and courts interpret the statute," including Immigration and Customs 
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Enforcement, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and Federal Circuit and district courts 
considering immigration-law and criminal-law issues); ABA Guidebook § 4.65, at 130 ("Because nothing 
is ever simple with immigration law, the terms 'conviction,' 'moral turpitude,' and 'single scheme of 
criminal misconduct' are terms of art"); id, § 4.67, at 130 ("[T]he term 'moral turpitude' evades precise 
definition"). 
[**302] Defense counsel who consults a guidebook on whether a particular crime is an "aggravated 
felony" will often find that the answer is not "easily ascertained." For example, the ABA Guidebook 
answers the question "Does simple possession count as an aggravated felony?" as follows: "Yes, at least 
in the Ninth Circuit." § 5.35, at 160 (emphasis added). After a dizzying paragraph that attempts to explain 
the evolution of the Ninth Circuit's view, the ABA Guidebook continues: "Adding to the confusion, 
however, is that the Ninth Circuit has conflicting opinions depending on the context on whether simple 
drug possession constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)." [***41] Id., § 5.35, at 
161 (citing cases distinguishing between whether a simple possession offense is an aggravated felony "for 
immigration purposes" or for "sentencing purposes"). The ABA Guidebook then proceeds to explain that 
"attempted possession," id, § 5.36, at 161 (emphasis added), of a controlled substance is an aggravated 
felony, while "[cjonviction under the federal accessory after the fact statute is probably not an aggravated 
felony, but a conviction for accessory after the fact to the manufacture of methamphetamine is an 
aggravated felony," id., § 537, at 161 (emphasis added). Conspiracy or attempt to commit drug trafficking 
are aggravated felonies, but "[solicitation is not a drug-trafficking offense because a generic solicitation 
offense is not an offense related to a controlled substance and therefore not an aggravated felony." Id., § 
5.41, at 162. 
Determining whether a particular crime is one involving moral turpitude is no easier. See id., at 134 
("Writing bad checks may or may not be a CIMT" (emphasis added)); ibid. ("[RJeckless assault coupled 
with an element of injury, but not serious injury, is probably not a CIMT" (emphasis added)); id., at 135 
(misdemeanor driving [***42] under the influence is generally not a CIMT, but may be a CIMT if the 
DUI results in injury or if the driver knew that his license had been suspended or revoked); id., at 136 ("If 
there is no element of actual injury, the endangerment offense may not be a CIMT" (emphasis added)); 
ibid. ("Whether [a child abuse] conviction involves moral turpitude may depend on the subsection under 
which the individual is convicted. Child abuse done with criminal negligence probably is not a CIMT" 
(emphasis added)). 
Many other terms of the INA are similarly ambiguous or may be confusing to practitioners not versed 
in the intricacies of immigration law. To take just a few examples, it may be hard, in some cases, for 
defense counsel even to determine whether a client is an alien,1 or whether a [*1490] particular state 
disposition will result in a "conviction" for purposes of federal immigration law.2 The task of offering 
advice about the immigration [**303] consequences of a criminal conviction is further complicated by 
other problems, including significant variations among Circuit interpretations of federal immigration 
statutes; the frequency with which immigration law changes; different rules governing the immigration 
[***43] consequences of juvenile, first-offender, and foreign convictions; and the relationship between 
the "length and type of sentence" and the determination "whether [an alien] is subject to removal, eligible 
for relief from removal, or qualified to become a naturalized citizen," Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, 
at 2-2 to 2-3. 
1 Citizens are not deportable, but "[q]uestions of citizenship are not always simple." ABA 
Guidebook § 4.20, at 113 (explaining that U.S. citizenship conferred by blood is " 'derivative,' " 
and that "[derivative citizenship depends on a number of confusing factors, including whether the 
citizen parent was the mother or father, the immigration laws in effect at the time of the parents' 
and/or defendant's birth, and the parents' marital status"). 
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2 "A disposition that is not a 'conviction,1 under state law may still be a 'conviction' for 
immigration purposes." Id., § 4.32, at 117 (citing Matter ofSalazar, 23I & N. Dec. 223, 231 (BIA 
2002) (en banc)). For example, state law may define the term "conviction" not to include a deferred 
adjudication, but such an adjudication would be deemed a conviction for purposes of federal 
immigration law. See ABA Guidebook § 4.37; accord, [***44] D. Kesselbrenner & L. Rosenberg, 
Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, p. 2-2 (2008) (hereinafter Immigration Law and Crimes) ("A 
practitioner or respondent will not even know whether the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) or the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) will treat a particular state 
disposition as a conviction for immigration purposes. In fact, the [BIA] treats certain state criminal 
dispositions as convictions even though the state treats the same disposition as a dismissal"). 
In short, the professional organizations and guidebooks on which the Court so heavily relies are right 
to say that "nothing is ever simple with immigration law"~including the determination whether 
immigration law clearly makes a particular offense removable. ABA Guidebook § 4.65, at 130; 
Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1. I therefore cannot agree with the Court's apparent view that the Sixth 
Amendment requires criminal defense attorneys to provide immigration advice. 
The Court tries to downplay the severity of the burden it imposes on defense counsel by suggesting 
that the scope of counsel's duty to offer advice concerning deportation consequences may turn on how 
hard it is to determine [***45] those consequences. Where "the terms of the relevant immigration statute 
are succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence[s]" of a conviction, the Court says, 
counsel has an affirmative duty to advise the client that he will be subject to deportation as a result of the 
plea. Ante, at , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 295. But "[w]hen the law is not succinct and straightforward . . . , a 
criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges 
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." Ante, at - , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 296. This 
approach is problematic for at least four reasons. 
First, it will not always be easy to tell whether a particular statutory provision is "succinct, clear, and 
explicit." How can an attorney who lacks general immigration law expertise be sure that a seemingly clear 
statutory provision actually means what it seems to say when read in isolation? What if the application of 
the provision to a particular case is not clear but a cursory examination of case law or administrative 
decisions would provide a definitive answer? See Immigration Law and Crimes § 2:1, at 2-2 
("Unfortunately, a practitioner or respondent cannot tell easily whether a conviction [***46] is for a 
removable offense. . . . [T]he cautious practitioner or apprehensive respondent will not know [*1491] 
conclusively the future immigration consequences of a guilty plea"). 
Second, if defense counsel must provide advice regarding only one of the many collateral 
consequences of a criminal conviction, many defendants are likely to be misled. To take just one 
example, a conviction for a particular offense may render an alien excludable but not removable. If an 
alien charged [**304] with such an offense is advised only that pleading guilty to such an offense will 
not result in removal, the alien may be induced to enter a guilty plea without realizing that a consequence 
of the plea is that the alien will be unable to reenter the United States if the alien returns to his or her 
home country for any reason, such as to visit an elderly parent or to attend a funeral. See ABA Guidebook 
§ 4.14, at 111 ("Often the alien is both excludable and removable. At times, however, the lists are 
different. Thus, the oddity of an alien that is inadmissible but not deportable. This alien should not leave 
the United States because the government will not let him back in" (emphasis in original)). Incomplete 
legal advice [***47] may be worse than no advice at all because it may mislead and may dissuade the 
client from seeking advice from a more knowledgeable source. 
Third, the Court's rigid constitutional rule could inadvertently head off more promising ways of 
addressing the underlying problem—such as statutory or administrative reforms requiring trial judges to 
inform a defendant on the record that a guilty plea may carry adverse immigration consequences. As 
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amid point out, "28 states and the District of Columbia have already adopted rules, plea forms, or statutes 
requiring courts to advise criminal defendants of the possible immigration consequences of their pleas." 
Brief for State of Louisiana et al. 25; accord, Chin & Holmes 708 ("A growing number of states require 
advice about deportation by statute or court rule"). A nonconstitutional rule requiring trial judges to 
inform defendants on the record of the risk of adverse immigration consequences can ensure that a 
defendant receives needed information without putting a large number of criminal convictions at risk; and 
because such a warning would be given on the record, courts would not later have to determine whether 
the defendant was misrepresenting [***48] the advice of counsel. Likewise, flexible statutory procedures 
for withdrawing guilty pleas might give courts appropriate discretion to determine whether the interests of 
justice would be served by allowing a particular defendant to withdraw a plea entered into on the basis of 
incomplete information. Cf. United States v. Russell, 686F.2d35, 39-40, 222 US App. D.C. 313 (CADC 
1982) (explaining that a district court's discretion to set aside a guilty plea under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure should be guided by, among other considerations, "the possible existence of prejudice 
to the government's case as a result of the defendant's untimely request to stand trial" and "the strength of 
the defendant's reason for withdrawing the plea, including whether the defendant asserts his innocence of 
the charge"). 
Fourth, the Court's decision marks a major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law. This Court decided 
Strickland in 1984, but the majority does not cite a single case, from this or any other federal court, 
holding that criminal defense counsel's failure to provide advice concerning the removal consequences of 
a criminal conviction violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As noted above, the 
[***49] Court's view has been rejected by every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the issue 
thus far. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 202 F.3d, at 28; Banda, 1 F.3d, at 355; Chin & Holmes 697, 699. The 
majority appropriately acknowledges that the lower courts [*1492] are "now quite experienced with 
applying Strickland," ante, at [**305] , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 297, but it casually dismisses the 
longstanding and unanimous position of the lower federal courts with respect to the scope of criminal 
defense counsel's duty to advise on collateral consequences. 
The majority seeks to downplay its dramatic expansion of the scope of criminal defense counsel's 
duties under the Sixth Amendment by claiming that this Court in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 
366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985), similarly "applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the 
client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty." Ante, at , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 297. That 
characterization of Hill obscures much more than it reveals. The issue in Hill was whether a criminal 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated where counsel misinformed the client about 
his eligibility for parole. The Court found it "unnecessary to determine whether there may be 
circumstances under which erroneous [***50] advice by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed 
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, because in the present case we conclude that petitioner's 
allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington requirement of'prejudice.' 474 U.S., at 
60, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203. Given that Hill expressly and unambiguously refused to decide 
whether criminal defense counsel must avoid misinforming his or her client as to one consequence of a 
criminal conviction (parole eligibility), that case plainly provides no support whatsoever for the 
proposition that counsel must affirmatively advise his or her client as to another collateral consequence 
(removal). By the Court's strange logic, Hill would support its decision here even if the Court had held 
that misadvice concerning parole eligibility does not make counsel's performance objectively 
unreasonable. After all, the Court still would have "applied Strickland" to the facts of the case at hand. 
II 
While mastery of immigration law is not required by Strickland, several considerations support the 
conclusion that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a conviction may constitute 
ineffective assistance. 
67 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
First, a rule prohibiting [***51] affirmative misadvice regarding a matter as crucial to the defendant's 
plea decision as deportation appears faithful to the scope and nature of the Sixth Amendment duty this 
Court has recognized in its past cases. In particular, we have explained that "a guilty plea cannot be 
attacked as based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not 'a reasonably competent attorney' and 
the advice was not 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases! " 
Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687, 104 S Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 770, 771, 90 S Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); emphasis added). As the Court appears to 
acknowledge, thorough understanding of the intricacies of immigration law is not "within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.1' See ante, at , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 295 
("Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own. Some members of the bar who 
represent clients facing criminal charges, in either state or federal court or both, may not be well versed in 
it"). By contrast, reasonably competent attorneys [**306] should know that it is not appropriate or 
responsible to hold themselves out as authorities on a difficult and complicated subject matter with which 
they are [***52] not familiar. Candor concerning the limits of one's professional expertise, in other 
words, is within the range of duties reasonably expected of defense attorneys in criminal cases. As the 
dissenting judge on [*1493] the Kentucky Supreme Court put it, "I do not believe it is too much of a 
burden to place on our defense bar the duty to say, 'I do not know.'" 253 S. W. 3d 482, 485 (2008). 
Second, incompetent advice distorts the defendant's decisionmaking process and seems to call the 
fairness and integrity of the criminal proceeding itself into question. See Strickland, 466 U.S., at 686, 104 
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 ("In giving meaning to the requirement [of effective assistance of counsel], 
we must take its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the guide"). When a defendant opts to plead guilty 
without definitive information concerning the likely effects of the plea, the defendant can fairly be said to 
assume the risk that the conviction may carry indirect consequences of which he or she is not aware. That 
is not the case when a defendant bases the decision to plead guilty on counsel's express misrepresentation 
that the defendant will not be removable. In the latter case, it seems hard to say that the plea was entered i 
[***53] with the advice of constitutionally competent counsel—or that it embodies a voluntary and 
intelligent decision to forsake constitutional rights. See ibid. ("The benchmark forjudging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result"). 
Third, a rule prohibiting unreasonable misadvice regarding exceptionally important collateral matters i 
would not deter or interfere with ongoing political and administrative efforts to devise fair and reasonable 
solutions to the difficult problem posed by defendants who plead guilty without knowing of certain 
important collateral consequences. 
Finally, the conclusion that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a 
conviction can give rise to ineffective assistance would, unlike the Court's approach, not require any 1 
upheaval in the law. As the Solicitor General points out, "[t]he vast majority of the lower courts 
considering claims of ineffective assistance in the plea context have [distinguished] between defense 
counsel who remain silent and defense counsel who give affirmative misadvice." [***54] Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 8 (citing cases). At least three Courts of Appeals have held that 
affirmative misadvice on immigration matters can give rise to ineffective assistance of counsel, at least in 
some circumstances.3 And several other Circuits have held that affirmative [**307] misadvice * 
concerning nonimmigration consequences of a conviction can violate the Sixth Amendment even if those 
consequences might be deemed "collateral."4 By contrast, it appears that [*1494] no court of appeals 
holds that affirmative misadvice concerning collateral consequences in general and removal in particular 
can never give rise to ineffective assistance. In short, the considered and thus far unanimous view of the 
lower federal courts charged with administering Strickland clearly supports the conclusion that that ^ 
Kentucky Supreme Court's position goes too far. 
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3 See United States v. Kwan, 407 K3d 1005, 1015-1017 (CA9 2005); United States v. Couto, 311 
F.3d 179, 188 (CA2 2002); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540-1541 (CA11 
1985) (limiting holding to the facts of the case); see also Santos-Sanchez v. United States, 548 FJd 
327, 333-334 (CA5 2008) (concluding that counsel's advice was [***55] not objectively 
unreasonable where counsel did not purport to answer questions about immigration law, did not 
claim any expertise in immigration law, and simply warned of "possible" deportation consequence; 
use of the word "possible" was not an affirmative misrepresentation, even though it could indicate 
that deportation was not a certain consequence). 
4 See Hill v. Lockhart, 894 F.2d 1009, 1010 (CA8 1990) (en banc) ("[T]he erroneous parole-
eligibility advice given to Mr. Hill was ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 
Washington"); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 FJd 882, 885 (CA6 1988) ("[Gjross misadvice concerning 
parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel"); id., at 886 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) ("When the maximum possible exposure is overstated, the defendant might well be 
influenced to accept a plea agreement he would otherwise reject"); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 
61, 65 (CA4 1979) ("[T]hough parole eligibility dates are collateral consequences of the entry of a 
guilty plea of which a defendant need not be informed if he does not inquire, when he is grossly 
misinformed about it by his lawyer, and relies upon that misinformation, he is deprived [***56] of 
his constitutional right to counsel"). 
In concluding that affirmative misadvice regarding the removal consequences of a criminal 
conviction may constitute ineffective assistance, I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does 
no more than require defense counsel to avoid misinformation. When a criminal defense attorney is aware 
that a client is an alien, the attorney should advise the client that a criminal conviction may have adverse 
consequences under the immigration laws and that the client should consult an immigration specialist if 
the client wants advice on that subject. By putting the client on notice of the danger of removal, such 
advice would significantly reduce the chance that the client would plead guilty under a mistaken premise. 
Ill 
In sum, a criminal defense attorney should not be required to provide advice on immigration law, a 
complex specialty that generally lies outside the scope of a criminal defense attorney's expertise. On the 
other hand, any competent criminal defense attorney should appreciate the extraordinary importance that 
the risk of removal might have in the client's determination whether to enter a guilty plea. Accordingly, 
unreasonable and incorrect [***57] information concerning the risk of removal can give rise to an 
ineffectiveness claim. In addition, silence alone is not enough to satisfy counsel's duty to assist the client. 
Instead, an alien defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is satisfied if defense counsel advises the 
client that a conviction may have immigration consequences, that immigration law is a specialized field, 
that the attorney is not an immigration lawyer, and that the client should consult an immigration specialist 
if the client wants advice on that subject. 
DISSENT BY: SCALIA 
DISSENT 
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting. 
In the best of all possible worlds, criminal defendants contemplating a guilty plea ought to be advised 
of all serious collateral consequences of conviction, and surely ought not to be misadvised. The 
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Constitution, however, is not an all-purpose tool for judicial construction of a perfect world; and when we 
ignore its text in [**308] order to make it that, we often find ourselves swinging a sledge where a tack 
hammer is needed. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a lawyer "for his defense" against a "criminal 
prosecutio[n]"-not for sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction. [***58] For that 
reason, and for the practical reasons set forth in Part I of Justice Alito's concurrence, I dissent from the 
Court's conclusion that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to provide accurate advice concerning the 
potential removal consequences of a guilty plea.. For the same reasons, but unlike the concurrence, I do 
not believe that affirmative misadvice about those consequences renders [*1495] an attorney's assistance 
in defending against the prosecution constitutionally inadequate; or that the Sixth Amendment requires 
counsel to warn immigrant defendants that a conviction may render them removable. Statutory provisions 
can remedy these concerns in a more targeted fashion, and without producing permanent, and legislatively 
irreparable, overkill. 
* * * 
The Sixth Amendment as originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to 
employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of counsel. See, United States v. Van Duzee, 140 US. 169, 
173, 11 S Ct. 758, 11 S Ct. 941, 35 L. Ed. 399 (1891); W. Beaney, Right to Counsel in American Courts 
21, 28-29 (1955). We have held, however, that the Sixth Amendment requires the provision of counsel to 
indigent defendants at government expense, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335, 344-345, 83 S. Ct. 792, 
9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), [***59] and that the right to "the assistance of counsel" includes the right to 
effective assistance, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984). Even assuming the validity of these holdings, I reject the significant further extension that the 
Court, and to a lesser extent the concurrence, would create. We have until today at least retained the Sixth 
Amendment's textual limitation to criminal prosecutions. "[W]e have held that 'defence' means defense at 
trial, not defense in relation to other objectives that may be important to the accused." Rothgery v. 
Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, , 128 S. Ct. 2578, 171 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(summarizing cases). We have limited the Sixth Amendment to legal advice directly related to defense 
against prosecution of the charged offense—advice at trial, of course, but also advice at postindictment 
interrogations and lineups, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-206, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 
246 (1964); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-238, 87 S Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967), and 
in general advice at all phases of the prosecution where the defendant would be at a disadvantage when 
pitted alone against the legally trained agents of the state, see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430, 106 
S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986). [***60] Not only have we not required advice of counsel regarding 
consequences collateral to prosecution, we have not even required counsel appointed to defend against 
one prosecution to be present when the defendant is interrogated in connection with another possible 
prosecution arising from the same event. Texas v. Cobb, 532 US. 162, 164, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L. Ed. 
2d 321 (2001). 
There is no basis in text or in principle [**309] to extend the constitutionally required advice 
regarding guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to the criminal prosecution at hand—to wit, the 
sentence that the plea will produce, the higher sentence that conviction after trial might entail, and the 
chances of such a conviction. Such matters fall within "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 
criminal cases," McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970). See 
id., at 769-770, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (describing the matters counsel and client must consider 
in connection with a contemplated guilty plea). We have never held, as the logic of the Court's opinion 
assumes, that once counsel is appointed all professional responsibilities of counsel-even those extending 
beyond defense against the prosecution—become constitutional commands. Cf. Cobb, supra, at 171, n. 2, 
121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L. Ed. 2d 321; [***61] Moran, supra, at 430, 106 S Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410. 
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Because the subject of the misadvice here was not the prosecution for which Jose Padilla was entitled to 
effective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment has no application. 
[*1496] Adding to counsel's duties an obligation to advise about a conviction's collateral 
consequences has no logical stopping-point. As the concurrence observes, 
"[A] criminal convictio[n] can carry a wide variety of consequences other than 
conviction and sentencing, including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right 
to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms, dishonorable 
discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses. . . . All of 
those consequences are 'serious,' . . . ." Ante, at - , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 300 (Alito, J., 
concurring in j udgment). 
But it seems to me that the concurrence suffers from the same defect. The same indeterminacy, the 
same inability to know what areas of advice are relevant, attaches to misadvice. And the concurrence's 
suggestion that counsel must warn defendants of potential removal consequences, see ante, at - , 
176 L. Ed. 2d, at 307—what would come to be known as the "Padilla warning"—cannot be limited to those 
consequences [***62] except by judicial caprice. It is difficult to believe that the warning requirement 
would not be extended, for example, to the risk of heightened sentences in later federal prosecutions 
pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We could expect years of elaboration 
upon these new issues in the lower courts, prompted by the defense bar's devising of ever-expanding 
categories of plea-invalidating misadvice and failures to warn-not to mention innumerable evidentiary 
hearings to determine whether misadvice really occurred or whether the warning was really given. 
The concurrence's treatment of misadvice seems driven by concern about the voluntariness of 
Padilla's guilty plea. See ante, at , 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 306. But that concern properly relates to the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not to the Sixth Amendment. See McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970). Padilla has not argued before us that his guilty 
plea was not knowing and voluntary. If that is, however, the true substance of [**310] his claim (and if 
he has properly preserved it) the state court can address it on remand.1 But we should not smuggle 
[***63] the claim into the Sixth Amendment. 
1 I do not mean to suggest that the Due Process Clause would surely provide relief. We have 
indicated that awareness of "direct consequences" suffices for the validity of a guilty plea. See 
Brady, 397 US, at 755, 90 S Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (internal quotation marks omitted). And 
the required colloquy between a federal district court and a defendant required by Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11(b) (formerly Rule 11(c)), which we have said approximates the due process 
requirements for a valid plea, see Libretti v. United States, 516 US. 29, 49-50, 116 S. Ct. 356, 133 
L. Ed. 2d 271 (1995), does not mention collateral consequences. Whatever the outcome, however, 
the effect of misadvice regarding such consequences upon the validity of a guilty plea should be 
analyzed under the Due Process Clause. 
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The Court's holding prevents legislation that could solve the problems addressed by today's opinions 
in a more precise and targeted fashion. If the subject had not been constitutionalized, legislation could 
specify which categories of misadvice about matters ancillary to the prosecution invalidate plea 
agreements, what collateral consequences counsel must bring to a defendant's attention, and what 
warnings must be given. [***64] 2 Moreover, legislation could provide consequences for the misadvice, 
[*1497] nonadvice, or failure to warn, other than nullification of a criminal conviction after the witnesses 
and evidence needed for retrial have disappeared. Federal immigration law might provide, for example, 
that the near-automatic removal which follows from certain criminal convictions will not apply where the 
conviction rested upon a guilty plea induced by counsel's misadvice regarding removal consequences. Or 
legislation might put the government to a choice in such circumstances: Either retry the defendant or 
forgo the removal. But all that has been precluded in favor of today's sledge hammer. 
2 As the Court's opinion notes, ante, at - , n. 15, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 299, many States-
including Kentucky-already require that criminal defendants be warned of potential removal 
consequences. 
In sum, the Sixth Amendment guarantees adequate assistance of counsel in defending against a 
pending criminal prosecution. We should limit both the constitutional obligation to provide advice and the 
consequences of bad advice to that well defined area. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NERIMJELASHOVIC, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
STATE'S ESQPO0ED FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER DENYING 
THE PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 100903903 
Judge Vernice S. Trease 
This matter came before the Court on 7 October 2010 for an evidentiary 
hearing on the remaining claim in the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: that 
Petitioner's counsel was ineffective for misadvising him about the immigration 
consequences of his guilty pleas. Petitioner was present and was represented by 
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counsel, Mr. Jonathon W. Grimes. The State appeared though counsel, Assistant 
Attorney General Christopher D. Ballard. 
In addition to the testimony and evidence received at the evidentiary 
hearing, the Court has reviewed and relied upon the court file in this case, and 
the record of the underlying criminal case, number 031900035, including all 
transcripts from that case. The Court incorporates the entire record from the 
underlying criminal case into this case. Now being fully advised in the premises, 
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
denying the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
BACKGROUND 
Petitioner, Nerim Jelashovic, seeks relief under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act (PCRA), UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-101 to -110, from his 
convictions for two counts of forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404. His Petition alleges two claims. 
Petition at 9-10. First, he claims that his counsel "threatened/' "berated/' and 
"coerced" him into entering his guilty pleas. Petition at 9,10. Second, he claims 
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by misadvising him about the 
immigration consequences of his guilty plea. Id. at 9. 
* **£ 
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The State moved to dismiss both claims as barred by the PCRA's statute of 
limitations, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-107. In an order entered 13 September 
2010, the Court granted the State's motion on Jelashovic's first claim, but denied 
the motion on his second claim. The Court set the evidentiary hearing to resolve 
the second claim. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
As petitioner, Jelashovic "has the burden of . . . proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle [him] to relief." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-105(l). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, Jelashovic must satisfy the two-part test of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, he must show "'that his counsel rendered 
a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment/" Benvenuto v. 
State, 2007 UT 53, % 18,165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988)). Second, he must show "'that counsel's performance prejudiced' 
him." Id. 
To demonstrate deficient performance, Jelashovic must show that his 
"'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.'" 
7C 
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Id. at f 19 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Reasonableness is assessed based 
on '"prevailing professional norms/" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
To demonstrate prejudice, Jelashovic must do more than simply "'show 
that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding/" 
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). Rather, he "'must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different/" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
694). 
"When challenging a guilty plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate '"a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors he . . . would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial/"" Id. at f 24 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 
1994) in turn quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). "[A] petitioner must 
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been 
rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,1485 (2010) 
(citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,480,486 (2000)). 
The prejudice inquiry turns, in large part, on the likelihood that Jelashovic 
could have succeeded if he had gone to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59-
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60 (1985). Indeed, "[C]ourts applying this standard will often review the 
strength of the prosecutor's case as the best evidence of whether a defendant in 
fact would have changed his plea and insisted on going to trial/7 Miller v. 
Champion, 262 F.3d 1066,1072 (10th Cir. 2001). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The criminal charges 
1. In January 2003, the State charged Jelashovic with two counts of 
aggravated sexual assault, a first degree felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-5-405. Both counts were punishable by minimum mandatory prison sentences 
of six, ten, or fifteen years to life. The charges were based on allegations that 
Jelashovic had vaginally and anally raped the victim, and that both acts caused 
the victim bodily injury. 
2. Jelashovic retained Mr. D. Christopher VanCampen to represent him. 
3. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, Mr. 
VanCampen determined that there was a substantial risk that Jelashovic would 
be convicted if the case went to trial. He understood that a conviction would 
result in a mandatory prison sentence. 
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4. Mr. VanCampen also understood that Jelashovic is not a citizen of the 
United States and therefore a conviction of aggravated sexual assault, or any 
other related felony, would make Jelashovic eligible for deportation. 
5. Mr. VanCampen's objectives in representing Jelashovic were to avoid 
prison and deportation if possible. 
6. Mr. VanCampen spoke with federal officials from United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement1 (ICE) and agents from Utah's Adult 
Probation and Parole (AP&P) about the likelihood that Jelashovic would actually 
be deported if he were convicted of a felony. Based on those conversations, Mr. 
VanCampen understood that although a felony conviction would make 
Jelashovic deportable, Jelashovic might be able to avoid actually being deported 
if he was sentenced to probation and successfully completed that probation. 
The plea agreement 
7. Mr. VanCampen therefore attempted to negotiate a plea agreement to 
charges for which probation would be a sentencing option. 
1
 The United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), was 
formerly known as the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service 
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8. Mr. VanCampen succeeded in negotiating such an agreement. The 
plea agreement provided that the State would reduce the original charges to two 
counts of forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-404. Those charges did not require a mandatory prison sentence. 
9. Mr. VanCampen advised Jelashovic to accept the plea offer because he 
believed that it gave Jelashovic the best opportunity to avoid prison and actual 
deportation. 
10. Jelashovic accepted the plea offer and pled guilty to two counts of 
forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony. 
11. Judge Hansen initially refused to accept the guilty pleas because 
Jelashovic insisted that his sexual contact with the victim was consensual. 
12. However, at a second plea hearing, Jelashovic admitted that the sexual 
contact was non-consensual. Judge Hansen therefore accepted the pleas. 
13. When he entered his guilty pleas, Jelashovic understood that there 
was no guarantee that he would be sentenced to probation. The plea affidavit 
and both plea colloquies establish that Jelashovic understood that Judge Hansen 
could sentence him to prison. Jelashovic also testified at the evidentiary hearing 
«n 
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that he understood when he entered his pleas that he could be sentenced to 
prison. 
Sentencing 
14. Judge Hansen ordered Jelashovic to undergo a ninety-day diagnostic 
evaluation at the Utah State Prison. 
15. During that evaluation, Jelashovic admitted to the evaluators that the 
victim did not consent. In fact, he eventually admitted to a version of the events 
that matched the victim's version. Jelashovic also admitted to the investigator 
who prepared the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report that the victim did not 
consent. 
16. At sentencing, the prosecutor recommended that Jelashovic be 
sentenced to probation and serve two years in jail as a condition of that 
probation. 
17. AP&P also recommended that Jelashovic be sentenced to probation. 
18. Judge Hansen mentioned at sentencing that it appeared the federal 
government was planning to deport Jelashovic because there was an I.N.S. hold 
on him. 
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19. Mr. VanCampen responded that, "I've discussed that with him and 
I'm told t h a t . . . as long as he performs well on probation and doesn't get into 
further trouble, that at this point, he's not going to be deported." Tr. of 6 
February 2004 Sentencing Hearing at 7. 
20. Judge Hansen disregarded the recommendations for probation and 
sentenced Jelashovic to serve concurrent sentences of one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison. 
21. Jelashovic now faces deportation proceedings once he is released from 
prison. 
Mr. VanCampen's advice 
22. Mr. VanCampen discussed the immigration consequences of the plea 
agreement with Jelashovic before he entered his guilty pleas. 
23. Mr. VanCampen testified that he advised Jelashovic that his guilty 
plea would make him deportable, but that he might be able to avoid actually 
being deported if he were sentenced to probation and successfully completed the 
probationary term. 
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24. Mr. VanCampen was adamant that he told Jelashovic that nothing was 
certain, and therefore there was no guarantee that successfully completing 
probation would mean he would not be deported. 
25. Jelashovic testified that Mr. VanCampen told him that there would not 
be any immigration consequences if he accepted the plea offer. 
26. However, Jelashovic's recollection of the alleged advice is unreliable 
because it is contrary to Mr. VanCampen's statement at the sentencing hearing. 
Mr. VanCampen's recollection of his advice about the immigration consequences 
is more consistent with his statement at sentencing. 
27. The unreliability of Jelashovic's recollection is also supported by his 
difficulty in remembering when he and his counsel discussed the immigration 
consequences of his plea. At one point, Jelashovic testified that he and his 
counsel did not discuss immigration consequences until the sentencing hearing. 
However, he later retracted this statement and testified that the consequences 
were discussed before the first plea hearing. 
28. Jelashovic's inconsistent statements about whether the victim 
consented also call into question the reliability of his testimony. In his criminal 
case, Jelashovic did not merely plead "not guilty." Rather, he affirmatively 
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represented to Judge Hansen that the victim had consented. His subsequent 
admissions that she did not consent are inconsistent with his previous statements 
and therefore undermine his credibility. 
29. Having considered all of the evidence and observed the witnesses' 
testimony, the Court finds that Mr. VanCampen provided the more reliable 
testimony about his advice to Jelashovic —specifically, that although a guilty plea 
would make Jelashovic deportable, it was possible that he would not actually be 
deported if he were sentenced to probation and successfully completed it. 
30. Jelashovic provided no testimony or evidence that this advice was / 
incorrect or otherwise objectively unreasonable based on prevailing professional 
norms. 
The State's evidence in the criminal case 
31. Had this case gone to trial, the State possessed overwhelming evidence 
that Jelashovic was guilty of the original aggravated sexual assault charges. That 
evidence is detailed in the following findings of fact. 
32. On the night of the crime, Jelashovic boasted that he was going to have 
sex that night and it did not matter with whom. 
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33. The crimes occurred during a party at Jelashovic's home. Jelashovic's 
friends were present along with the victim, her best friend, her twin brother, and 
her step-sister. 
34. Jelashovic took the victim into his bedroom where he had 
pornographic posters on the walls depicting women using sex toys. The 
prosecutor would have sought to introduce the posters to demonstrate 
Jelashovic's objectification of women. 
35. The victim would have testified that she told Jelashovic that she did 
not want to have sex, that she was menstruating, and that she was also using a 
tampon at the time. 
36. The victim would have also testified that she physically resisted 
Jelashovic's attempts to kiss her, remove her clothing, and have sex with her. 
37. The victim would have testified that Jelashovic forcibly removed her 
clothing and raped her both vaginally and anally. Jelashovic then ejaculated on 
her abdomen or stomach and threw her a t-shirt, telling her to wipe herself off. 
38. The victim left Jelashovic's bedroom, found her best friend, and 
immediately told her that Jelashovic had raped her and that her tampon was lost 
inside of her. The victim's hands were covered in blood. 
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39. The victim immediately left Jelashovic's house with her friend, her 
brother, and her step-sister, and went directly to the hospital. 
40. A forensic nurse examined the victim at the hospital. The nurse noted 
that the victim was bleeding and had suffered significant injuries to her vagina 
and anus. The victim was in severe pain and crying during the exam. 
41. The forensic nurse discovered the victim's tampon jammed sideways 
under the lip of her cervix. 
42. The prosecutor was confident that although the victim had some 
anxiety about testifying, she would have been willing and able to testify had the 
case gone to trial. 
43. Jelashovic admitted to officers that he had had sex with the victim and 
that he had ejaculated on her chest. His semen was found on the victim's pants. 
44. The prosecutor testified that the witnesses agreed to "ninety percent" 
of the facts and the only disputed issue was whether the sexual contact was 
consensual. 
45. Approximately two weeks before the scheduled trial date, Jelashovic 
made inculpatory statements to an investigator who went to measure his home 
to diagram it in preparation for the trial. Jelashovic told the investigator that he 
A C 
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had had sex with the victim and that he was trying to get in touch with his 
defense counsel so that he could enter a guilty plea. Jelashovic also admitted to 
the investigator that he had done something wrong and that he wanted to move 
on. 
46. At the evidentiary hearing, Jelashovic presented no evidence that 
would have supported a defense that the victim had consented. 
47. Jelashovic's subsequent admissions that the victim did not consent 
demonstrate that any consent defense would have been a fabrication. 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Jelashovic fails to demonstrate that Mr. VanCampen performed 
deficiently. Jelashovic provided no evidence that Mr. VanCampen's advice 
about the immigration consequences of the plea was incorrect or otherwise 
objectively unreasonable. 
2. Jelashovic also fails to demonstrate prejudice. Even assuming that Mr. 
VanCampen's advice amounted to deficient performance, Jelashovic fails to 
demonstrate that, had he known that accepting the plea would make him 
deportable, he would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on going to trial. 
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Jelashovic fails to demonstrate that it"would have been rational under the 
circumstances'' to reject the plea bargain. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 
1485 (2010). Although accepting the plea offer would make him deportable, 
being convicted of more serious charges at trial would have also made him 
deportable. 
Given the evidence that the State possessed, Jelashovic had little, if any 
chance of acquittal at trial. It was unlikely that any reasonable juror would have 
believed that the victim consented. Jelashovic's admissions to the diagnostic 
evaluators and AP&P agents demonstrate that the consent defense was a 
fabrication. A conviction at trial on the more serious charges would have 
resulted in a mandatory prison sentence of at least six, and maybe twelve years, 
and still subjected Jelashovic to deportation. 
However, the plea offer gave Jelashovic an opportunity to avoid prison. 
And, based on the evidence before the Court, the plea offer also gave Jelashovic 
his best opportunity to avoid actually being deported. Given these facts, 
Jelashovic fails to demonstrate that it would have been rational to reject the plea 
offer and go to trial. 
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Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court 
enters the following: 
ORDER 
Petitioner's remaining claim that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by misadvising him of the immigration consequences of his guilty 
pleas is DENIED. 
Whereas this resolves the only remaining claim for relief, the Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief is^also DENIED. 
DATED Z_!_-Qctp5aF2010-
BY THE COURT: 
VERNICEXTREA: 
Third Judicial Distric^^frrtji 
Submitted by counsel for Respondent 
21 October 2010 
Christopher D. Ballard 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 21 October 20101 mailed, postage prepaid, a copy 
of the foregoing STATE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF, to: 
Jonathon W. Grimes 
FLINT, GRIMES & HULLINGER 
455 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD (8497) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
cballar d@utah. gov 
Respondent's Counsel 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NERIMJELASHOVIC, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON THE STATE'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 100903903 
Judge Vernice S. Trease 
This matter came before the Court on 25 August 2010 for argument on the 
State's motion to dismiss the Petition as untimely. Petitioner was present and 
was represented by counsel, Mr. Jonathon W. Grimes. The State appeared 
though counsel, Assistant Attorney General Christopher D. Ballard. Having 
n 4 
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reviewed all of the memoranda filed in relation to the motion and heard 
argument from both parties the Court now rules as follows. 
ANALYSIS 
Although the Utah Supreme Court retains constitutional authority over 
post-conviction review, the 2010 amendment to Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, demonstrates that the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), including its statute of limitations, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78B-9-107, as controlling. Based on Rule 65C, and Gardner v. State, 
2010 UT 46, | f 58-61, 90-94, 658 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, the Court concludes that it 
must apply the PCRA as written and that it cannot read an exception into the 
Act's statute of limitations. 
Applying the PCRA's statute of limitations, the Court concludes that the 
State's motion should be granted in part and denied in part. The State's motion 
is granted as to Petitioner's claim that his counsel coerced him into entering his 
guilty plea. Petitioner knew of the evidentiary facts supporting that claim after 
his 18 July 2003 plea hearing. Therefore, his claim accrued when his conviction 
became final on 12 March 2004, and Petitioner then had one year, or until 12 
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March 2005, to assert this claim. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-107(l). Because 
he did not raise this claim until 8 March 2010, it is untimely. 
The State's motion is denied as to Petitioner's claim that his counsel 
misrepresented the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas. A post-
conviction cause of action accrues on "the date on which petitioner knew or 
should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts 
on which the petition is based/7 See id. § 78B-9-107(2)(e). The State contends that 
Petitioner knew of the evidentiary facts supporting this claim when he was 
sentenced on 6 February 2004. However, the Court cannot find that Petitioner 
knew of sufficient evidentiary facts at the sentencing hearing to cause this claim 
to accrue. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. The State's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. 
2. With respect to Petitioner's claim that his guilty plea is invalid because 
his counsel "threatened/' "berated," and "coerced" him into entering his guilty 
pleas, the State's motion is GRANTED and that claim is DISMISSED. 
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3. With respect to Petitioner's claim that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance because he misrepresented the immigration consequences of 
Petitioner's guilty plea, the State's motion is DENIED. 
DATED (° ^ a f c t 2010 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
VERN*6B$. IREASE 
Third Jucfifija| District Court Judge 
• •> *o : : . " 
Jonathon W. Grimes 
Counsel for Petitioner 
94 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 26 August 20101 mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the foregoing (proposed) ORDER ON THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS, to: 
Jonathon W. Grimes 
FLINT, GRIMES & HULLINGER 
455 East 400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
D 
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Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Executive Office for Immigration Review 
OMB No. 1615-0067; Expires 04/30/11 
1-589, Application for Asylum 
and for Withholding of Removal 
START HERE - Type or print in black ink. See the instructions for information about eligibilty and how to complete and file this 
application. There is NO filing fee for this application. _____ 
NOTE: Check this box if you also want to apply for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. 
• 
1. Alien Registration Number(s) (A-Number) (if any) 
A-071-754-808 
2. U.S. Social Security Number (if any) 
647-38-1088 
3. Complete Last Name 
Jelaskovic 
4. First Name 
Nerim 
5. Middle Name 
6. What other names have you used (include maiden name and aliases)? 
7. Residence in the U.S. (where you physically reside) Telephone Number 
(801 ) 849-8873 
Street Number and Name 
3710 S. 5600 W. 
Apt. Number 
City 
West Valley City 
State 
UT 
Zip Code 
84120 
8. Mailing Address in the U.S. 
(if different than the address in No. 7) 
In Care Of (if applicable): 
Telephone Number 
( ) 
Street Number and Name Apt. Number 
City State Zip Code 
9. Gender: Male LJ Female 10. Marital Status: |X] Single LJ Married LJ Divorced LJ Widowed 
11. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy) 
03/27/1984 
12. City and Country of Birth 
Sarajevo, Yugoslavia 
13. Present Nationality (Citizenship) 
Bosnia Herzogovina 
14. Nationality at Birth 
Yugoslavian 
15. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group 
Bosnian 
16. Religion 
Catholic 
17. Check the box, a through c, that applies:
 a . • I have never been in Immigration Court proceedings. 
b. [X] I am now in Immigration Court proceedings. c- LJ I am not now in Immigration Court proceedings, but I have been in the past. 
18. Complete 18 a through c. 
a. When did you last leave your country? (mmm/dd/yyyy) 01/01/1991 b. What is your current 1-94 Number, if any? 
c. List each entry into the U.S. beginning with your most recent entry. 
List date (mm/dd/yyyy), place, and your status for each entry.(Attach additional sheets as needed.) 
Date 
Date 
Date 
12/11/1997 Place Chicago 
Place 
Place 
Status Refugee 
Status 
Status 
Date Status Expires: 
19. What country issued your last 
passport or travel document? 
Bosnia 
20. Passport # 
Travel Document # 
21. Expiration Date 
(mm/dd/yyyy) 
06/11/2005 
22. What is your native language 
(include dialect, if applicable)? 
Serbo-Croatian 
For EOIR use only. 
23. Are you fluent in English? 
[X] Yes • No 
24. What other languages do you speak fluently? 
English 
Action: 
Interview Date: 
Asylum Officer ID#: 
ForUSCIS use only. Decision: 
Approval Date: 
Denial Date: 
Referral Date: 
Form I-SKQ fRpv 04/fK/l fhV 
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tart A, II*Infontaatioii About Yjour Spouse and Children 
Your spouse I am not married. (Skip to Your Children below.) 
1. Alien Registration Number (A-Number) 
Of any) 
5. Complete Last Name 
9. Date of Marriage (mm/dd/yyyy) 
12. Nationality (Citizenship) 
2. Passport/ID Card No. 
(ifany) 3. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy) 
6. First Name 
4. U.S. Social Security No. (ifany) 
7. Middle Name 
10. Place of Marriage 
13. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group 
8. Maiden Name 
11. City and Country of Birth 
14. Gender 
| | Male Q Female 
15. Is this person in the U.S.? 
| | Yes (Complete Blocks 16 to 24.) Q] No (Specify location): 
16. Place of last entry into the U.S. 
20. What is your spouse's 
current status/ 
17. Date of last entry into the 
U.S. (mm/dd/yyyy) 
21. What is the expiration date of his/her 
authorized stay, if any? (mm/dd/yyyy) 
18.1-94 No. (ifany) 
22. Is your spouse in Immigration 
Court proceedings? 
• Yes • No 
19. Status when last admitted 
(Visa type, ifany) 
23. If previously in the U.S., date of 
previous arrival (mm/dd/yyyy) 
24. If in the U.S., is your spouse to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.) 
| | Yes (Attach one photograph of your spouse in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submitted for this person.) 
• No 
Your Children. List all of your children, regardless of age, location, or marital status. 
[X] I do not have any children. (Skip to Part A. III., Information about your background.) 
| | I have children. Total number of children: 
(NOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement A or attach additional sheets of paper and documentation if you have more than four children.) 
1. Alien Registration Number (A-Number) (ifany) 
2. Passport/ID Card No. (ifany) 3. Marital Status (Married, Single, 
Divorced, Widowed) 
4. U.S. Social Security No. 
(ifany) 
5. Complete Last Name 6. First Name 7. Middle Name 8. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy) 
9. City and Country of Birth 10. Nationality (Citizenship) 11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group 12. Gender 
[ | Male Q Female 
13. Is this child in the U.S. ? 
| | Yes (Complete Blocks 14 to 21.) Q No (Specify location.) 
14. Place of last entry in the U.S. 15. Date of last entry in the 
U.S. (mm/dd/yyyy) 
16.1-94 No. (ifany) 17. Status when last admitted 
(Visa type, ifany) 
18. What is your child's 
current status? 
19. What is the expiration date of his/her 
authorized stay, if any? (mm/dd/yyyy) 
20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings? 
• Yes • No 
21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.) 
| | Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submitted for this person.) 
• No 
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|art A. II, Information About Your Spouse and Children (Continue 
1. Alien Registration Number (A-Number) 
Of any) 
2. Passport/ID Card No. (if any) 3. Marital Status (Married, Single, 
Divorced, Widowed) 
4. U.S. Social Security No. 
(ifany) 
5. Complete Last Name 6. First Name 7. Middle Name 8. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy) 
9. City and Country of Birth 10. Nationality (Citizenship) 11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group 12. Gender 
| | Male Q Female 
13. Is this child in the U.S. ? 
| | Yes (Complete Blocks 14 to 21.) Q No (Specify location.) 
14. Place of last entry into the U.S. 15. Date of last entry into the 
U.S. (mm/dd/yyyy) 
16.1-94 No. (Ifany) 17. Status when last admitted 
(Visa type, ifany) 
18. What is your child's 
current status? 
19. What is the expiration date of his/her 
authorized stay, ifany? (mm/dd/yyyy) 
20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings? 
• Yes • No 
21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.) 
| | Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submitted for this person.) 
• No 
1. Alien Registration Number (A-Number) 
(ifany) 
2. Passport/ID Card No. (ifany) 3. Marital Status (Married, Single, 
Divorced, Widowed) 
4. U.S. Social Security No. 
(ifany) 
5. Complete Last Name 6. First Name 7. Middle Name 8. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy) 
9. City and Country of Birth 10. Nationality (Citizenship) 11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group 12. Gender 
• Male | | Female 
13. Is this child in the U.S.? 
| | Yes (Complete Blocks 14 to 21.) Q] No (Specify location.) 
14. Place of last entry into the U.S. 15. Date of last entry into the 
U.S. (mm/dd/yyyy) 
16.1-94 No. (Ifany) 17. Status when last admitted 
(Visa type, ifany) 
18. What is your child's 
current status? 
19. What is the expiration date of his/her 
authorized stay, if any? (mm/dd/yyyy) 
20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings? 
• Yes • No 
21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.) 
| | Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submitted for this person.) 
• No 
1. Alien Registration Number (A-Number) 
(ifany) 
2. Passport/ID Card No. (ifany) 3. Marital Status (Married, Single, 
Divorced, Widowed) 
4. U.S. Social Security No. 
(ifany) 
5. Complete Last Name 6. First Name 7. Middle Name 8. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy) 
9. City and Country of Birth 10. Nationality (Citizenship) 11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group 12. Gender 
| | Male Q Female 
13. Is this child in the U.S. ? | | Yes (Complete Blocks 14 to 21.) Q] No (Specify location.) 
14. Place of last entry into the U.S. 15. Date of last entry into the 
U.S. (mm/dd/yyyy) 
16.1-94 No. (ifany) 17. Status when last admitted 
(Visa type, ifany) 
18. What is your child's 
current status? 
19. What is the expiration date of his/her 
authorized stay, ifany? (mm/dd/yyyy) 
20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings? 
• Yes • No 
21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.) 
| | Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submitted for this person.) 
• No 
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1. List your last address where you lived before coming to the United States. If this is not the country where you fear persecution, also list the last 
address in the country where you fear persecution. (List Address, City/Town, Department, Province, or State and Country.) 
(1VOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or additional sheets of paper, if necessary.) 
Number and Street 
(Provide if available) City /Town 
Sarajevo 
Department, Province, or State Country 
Austria 
Bosnia 
Dates 
From (Mo/Yr) To (Mo/Yr) 
2. Provide the following information about your residences during the past 5 years. List your present address first. 
(1VOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or additional sheets of paper, if necessary.) 
Number and Street 
3710 South 5600 West 
City /Town 
West Valley City 
Department, Province, or State 
Utah 
Country 
USA 
Dates 
From (Mo/Yr) To (Mo/Yr) 
3. Provide the following information about your education, beginning with the most recent. 
(NOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or additional sheets of paper, if necessary.) 
Name of School Type of School Location (Address) Attended From (Mo/Yr) To (Mo/Yr) 
4. Provide the following information about your employment during the past 5 years. List your present employment first. 
(NOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or additional sheets of paper, if necessary.) 
Name and Address of Employer Your Occupation Dates From (Mo/Yr) To (Mo/Yr) 
5. Provide the following information about your parents and siblings (brothers and sisters). Check the box if the person is deceased. 
(NOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or additional sheets of paper, if necessary.) 
Full Name 
Mother Suzana Murfitt 
Father Hajrudin Jelaskovic 
Sibling Maisa Jelaskovic 
Sibling 
Sibling 
Sibling 
City/Town and Country of Birth 
Sarajevo, Yugoslavia 
Sarajevo, Yugoslavia 
Sarajevo, Yugoslavia 
Current Location 
Q Deceased Salt Lake City 
[ | Deceased Salt Lake City 
• Deceased Salt Lake City 
| | Deceased 
| | Deceased 
| | Deceased 
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*%• s^^s^w^y'A^'A ^ 
tioa Aboyt Your Application 
(1VOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or attach additional sheets of paper as needed to complete your responses to the questions contained in 
PartB.) 
When answering the following questions about your asylum or other protection claim (withholding of removal under 241(b)(3) of the INA or 
withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture), you must provide a detailed and specific account of the basis of your claim to 
asylum or other protection. To the best of your ability, provide specific dates, places, and descriptions about each event or action described. You 
must attach documents evidencing the general conditions in the country from which you are seeking asylum or other protection and the specific facts 
on which you are relying to support your claim. If this documentation is unavailable or you are not providing this documentation with your 
application, explain why in your responses to the following questions. 
Refer to Instructions, Part 1: Filing Instructions, Section II, "Basis of Eligibility," Parts A - D, Section V, "Completing the Form," Part B, and 
Section VII, "Additional Evidence That You Should Submit," for more information on completing this section of the form. 
1. Why are you applying for asylum or withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, or for withholding of removal under the 
Convention Against Torture? Check the appropriate box(es) below and then provide detailed answers to questions A and B below: 
I am seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on: 
• Race • 
[X] Religion • 
Political opinion 
Membership in a particular social group 
• Nationality [x]
 T o r t u r e Convention 
A. Have you, your family, or close friends or colleagues ever experienced harm or mistreatment or threats in the past by anyone? 
• No [x] Yes 
If "Yes," explain in detail: 
1. What happened; 
2. When the harm or mistreatment or threats occurred; 
3. Who caused the harm or mistreatment or threats; and 
4. Why you believe the harm or mistreatment or threats occurred. 
My father is Muslim, but my mother is Catholic, and when they lived in Bosnia, she had to pretend to be Muslim as well. It was dangerous to be 
Christian, and especially dangerous to be in a mixed family. My mother was threatened in our apartment when my father was away, and 
shortly afterwards, we were able to escape Sarajevo. 
Our family friend was a Muslim with a Christian wife, and when he refused to kill people of her religion, the soldiers killed him and two others 
who refused to kill Christians. 
When my grandmother and uncle tried to leave Sarajevo when the war started, they were stopped with other people at the outskirts of the 
city, and held by soldiers in a school for several days without food or bedding. They were threatened every day, but fortunately, the soldiers 
received orders to let them go. Eventually, they were able to leave Bosnia. • 
B. Do you fear harm or mistreatment if you return to your home country? 
• No [X]. Yes 
If "Yes," explain in detail: 
1. What harm or mistreatment you fear; 
2. Who you believe would harm or mistreat you; and 
3. Why you believe you would or could be harmed or mistreated. 
While Catholics have very few rights, and their complaints are ignored by authorities, the real problem involves my tattoos. Tattoos are not 
allowed at all in Islam, and it will be impossible to hide them all. Not only that, I have a large cross on my back. I fear anyone who sees it will 
respond with violence and I will not be able to get help from police. Also, because I have a Muslim name, I will be viewed with suspicion from 
the Christians, and they will not trust that I am Catholic. My father has told me that if I go back to Bosnia, I will have to pretend to be Muslim, 
but I am a Catholic and I don't think I could hide that. 
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2. Have you or your family members ever been accused, charged, arrested, detained, interrogated, convicted and sentenced, or imprisoned 
in any country other than the United States? 
Q N o [X] Yes 
If "Yes," explain the circumstances and reasons for the action. 
My grandmother and uncle were detained when trying to leave Sarajevo when the war started. They were held for several days with many other 
people, but were never told why. As far as I know, there were never any charges, interrogations, or convictions. 
3.A. Have you or your family members ever belonged to or been associated with any organizations or groups in your home country, such 
as, but not limited to, a political party, student group, labor union, religious organization, military or paramilitary group, civil patrol, 
guerrilla organization, ethnic group, human rights group, or the press or media? 
[X] No • Yes 
If "Yes," describe for each person the level of participation, any leadership or other positions held, and the length of time you or your 
family members were involved in each organization or activity. 
B. Do you or your family members continue to participate in any way in these organizations or groups? 
[X] No • Yes 
If "Yes," describe for each person your or your family members' current level of participation, any leadership or other positions currently 
held, and the length of time you or your family members have been involved in each organization or group. 
4. Are you afraid of being subjected to torture in your home country or any other country to which you may be returned? 
• No [X] Yes 
If "Yes," explain why you are afraid and describe the nature of torture you fear, by whom, and why it would be inflicted. 
As I explained before, I am Catholic with a Muslim name. I also have a cross tattooed on my back. In Bosnia, this is like a target. I am in 
danger from anyone who sees it, including the police, and possibly from members of my extended family who still live there. I am afraid that I 
will be beaten or even killed and nobody will be able to stop it. 
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(NOTE: Use Form 1-589 Supplement B, or attach additional sheets of paper as needed to complete your responses to the questions contained in 
PartC.) 
1. Have you, your spouse, your child(ren), your parents or your siblings ever applied to the U.S. Government for refugee status, asylum, or 
withholding of removal? 
• No [X] Yes 
If "Yes," explain the decision and what happened to any status you, your spouse, your child(ren), your parents, or your siblings received as a 
result of that decision. Indicate whether or not you were included in a parent or spouse's application. If so, include your parent or spouse's A-
number in your response. If you have been denied asylum by an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals, describe any change(s) 
in conditions in your country or your own personal circumstances since the date of the denial that may affect your eligibility for asylum. 
I was included on my parents' Refugee Application from Austria. It was granted in December 1997, and we came to America. 
2. A. After leaving the country from which you are claiming asylum, did you or your spouse or child(ren) who are now in the United States travel 
through or reside in any other country before entering the United States? [ 1 No [x] Yes 
B. Have you, your spouse, your child(ren), or other family members, such as your parents or siblings, ever applied for or received any lawful 
status in any country other than the one from which you are now claiming asylum? 
• No [X] Yes 
If "Yes" to either or both questions (2 A and/or 2B), provide for each person the following: the name of each country and the length of stay, 
the person's status while there, the reasons for leaving, whether or not the person is entitled to return for lawful residence purposes, and 
whether the person applied for refugee status or for asylum while there, and if not, why he or she did not do so. 
We went to the Czech Republic after leaving Bosnia. We did not need to file any applications, because they just opened the borders to the 
refugees. We lived there for about 15 months. 
Then we moved to Austria, where we lived for five years. We did not need to file any refugee status there, but every year, the government 
renewed work visas for my parents. 
Have you, your spouse or your child(ren) ever ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in causing harm or suffering to any person 
because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or belief in a particular political opinion? 
[Xj No • Yes 
If "Yes," describe in detail each such incident and your own, your spouse's, or your child(ren)'s involvement. 
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Part C« Mditloiial Information About Your Application (Continued) 
4. After you left the country where you were harmed or fear harm, did you return to that country? 
• No [X] Yes 
If "Yes," describe in detail the circumstances of your visit(s) (for example, the date(s) of the trip(s), the purpose(s) of the trip(s), and the 
length of time you remained in that country for the visit(s).) 
After the war, my family returned to Sarajevo, Bosnia for three days to say goodbye to my father's family. Most of my mother's family had 
already left. 
5. Are you filing this application more than 1 year after your last arrival in the United States? 
• No [X] Yes 
If "Yes," explain why you did not file within the first year after you arrived. You must be prepared to explain at your interview or hearing 
why you did not file your asylum application within the first year after you arrived. For guidance in answering this question, see 
Instructions, Part 1: Filing Instructions, Section V. "Completing the Form," Part C. 
Having been granted status as a refugee, and receiving LPR status, there was no reason to apply for asylum. Due to my legal troubles, I am 
now in removal proceedings, and may be sent to Bosnia before the Post Conviction Relief proceedings are finished. I am afraid to go back to 
Bosnia, which is why I am filing this application. 
6. Have you or any member of your family included in the application ever committed any crime and/or been arrested, charged, 
convicted, or sentenced for any crimes in the United States? 
• No [X] Yes 
If "Yes," for each instance, specify in your response: what occurred and the circumstances, dates, length of sentence received, location, the 
duration of the detention or imprisonment, reason(s) for the detention or conviction, any formal charges that were lodged against you or 
your relatives included in your application, and the reason(s) for release. Attach documents referring to these incidents, if they are 
available, or an explanation of why documents are not available. 
I had sex with a girl in 2002, and was charged with rape in Salt Lake City District Court. I pled guilty to two counts of forcible sexual assault 
on my attorney's advice in 2003. I received concurrent sentences of 1 - 15 years. I am now on parole, and am in Post Conviction Relief 
proceedings with the Utah Appellate Court. 
I don't believe anyone in my family has been charged with any crimes. 
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I certify, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, that this application and the! 
evidence submitted with it are all true and correct. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546(a), provides in part: 
Whoever knowingly makes under oath, or as permitted under penalty of perjury under Section 1746 of Title 28, 
United States Code, knowingly subscribes as true, any false statement with respect to a material fact in any 
application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder, or 
knowingly presents any such application, affidavit, or other document containing any such false statement orl 
which fails to contain any reasonable basis in law or fact - shall be fined in accordance with this title or| 
imprisoned for up to 25 years. I authorize the release of any information from my immigration record that U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) needs to determine eligibility for the benefit I am seeking. 
Staple your photograph here or 
the photograph of the family 
member to be included on the 
extra copy of the application 
submitted for that person. 
WARNING: Applicants who are in the United States illegally are subject to removal if their asylum or withholding claims are not granted 
by an asylum officer or an immigration judge. Any information provided in completing this application may be used as a basis for the 
institution of, or as evidence in, removal proceedings even if the application is later withdrawn. Applicants determined to have knowingly 
made a frivolous application for asylum will be permanently ineligible for any benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act. You 
may not avoid a frivolous finding simply because someone advised you to provide false information in your asylum application. If filing 
with USCIS, unexcused failure to appear for an appointment to provide biometrics (such as fingerprints) and your biographical 
information within the time allowed may result in an asylum officer dismissing your asylum application or referring it to an immigration 
judge. Failure without good cause to provide DHS with biometrics or other biographical information while in removal proceedings may 
result in your application being found abandoned by the immigration judge. See sections 208(d)(5)(A) and 208(d)(6) of the INA and 8 CFR 
sections 208.10,1208.10, 208.20,1003.47(d) and 1208.20. 
Print your complete name. Write your name in your native alphabet. 
Did your spouse, parent, or child(ren) assist you in completing this application? [ ] No |x] YQS (If "Yes," list the name and relationship.) 
Suzana Murfitt Mother 
(Name) (Relationship) (Name) 
Did someone other than your spouse, parent, or child(ren) prepare this application? P ] No 
Asylum applicants may be represented by counsel. Have you been provided with a list of 
(Relationship) 
Yes (If "Yes, "complete Part E.) 
persons who may be available to assist you, at little or no cost, with your asylum claim? 
Signature of Applicant (The person in Part A.I.) 
No • Yes 
Sign your name so it all appears within the brackets Date (mm/dd/yyyy) 
I declare that I have prepared this application at the request of the person named in Part D, that the responses provided are based on all information 
of which I have knowledge, or which was provided to me by the applicant, and that the completed application was read to the applicant in his or her 
native language or a language he or she understands for verification before he or she signed the application in my presence. I am aware that the 
knowing placement of false information on the Form 1-589 may also subject me to civil penalties under 8 U.S.C. 1324c and/or criminal penalties 
under 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). 
Signature of Preparer 
Daytime Telephone Number 
!( ) 
Apt. No. 
Print Complete Name of Preparer 
Address of Preparer: Street Number and Name 
City State Zip Code 
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feajrtJF. ToJBe Completed at Asylum Interview, if Applicable 
NOTE: Fow w/7/ be asked to complete this part when you appear for examination before an asylum officer of the Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 
I swear (affirm) that I know the contents of this application that I am signing, including the attached documents and supplements, that they are 
I I all true or |_J not all true to the best of my knowledge and that correction(s) numbered to were made by me or at my request. 
Furthermore, I am aware that if I am determined to have knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum I will be permanently ineligible for any 
benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that I may not avoid a frivolous finding simply because someone advised me to provide 
false information in my asylum application. 
Signed and sworn to before me by the above named applicant on: 
Signature of Applicant Date (mm/dd/yyyy) 
Write Your Name in Your Native Alphabet Signature of Asylum Officer 
NOTE: You will be asked to complete this Part when you appear before an immigration judge of the U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office 
for Immigration Review (EOIR), for a hearing. 
I swear (affirm) that I know the contents of this application that I am. signing, including the attached documents and supplements, that they are 
| {all true or Q not all true to the best of my knowledge and that correction(s) numbered to were made by me or at my request. 
Furthermore, I am aware that if I am determined to have knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum I will be permanently ineligible for any 
benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that I may not avoid a frivolous finding simply because someone advised me to provide 
false information in my asylum application. 
Signed and sworn to before me by the above named applicant on: 
Signature of Applicant Date (mm/dd/yyyy) 
Write Your Name in Your Native Alphabet Signature of Immigration Judge 
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Supplement A, Form 1-589 
A-Number (If available) 
Applicant's Name 
Date 
Applicant's Signature 
iL'ist AH of Your Children* Regardless of Age or Marital Status 1 
l^^ffiE: Use this form and attach additional pages and documentation as needed, if you have more than four children) 
1. Alien Registration Number 
(A-Number) (if any) 
5. Complete Last Name 
9. City and Country of Birth 
2. Passport/ID Card Number 
(ifany) 
6. First Name 
10. Nationality (Citizenship) 
3. Marital Status (Married, Single, 
Divorced, Widowed) 
7. Middle Name 
11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group 
4. U.S. Social Security Number 
(ifany) 
8. Date of Birth 
(mm/dd/yyyy) 
12. Gender 
1 1 Male LJ Female 
13. Is this child in the U.S.? EH Yes (Complete blocks 14 to 21.) \Z\ No (Specify location.) | 
14. Place of last entry into the U.S. 
18. What is your child's current 
status? 
15. Date of last entry into the U.S. 
(mm/dd/yyyy) 16. 1-94 Number (ifany) 
19. What is the expiration date of his/her authorized 
stay, if any? (mm/dd/yyyy) 
17. Status when last admitted 
(Visa type, ifany) 
20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings? 
• Yes • No 
21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.) 
1 1 Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submitted for this 1
—' person.) 
n No 
1. Alien Registration Number 
(A-Number) (if any) 
5. Complete Last Name 
9. City and Country of Birth 
2. Passport/ID Card Number 
(ifany) 
6. First Name 
10. Nationality (Citizenship) 
3. Marital Status (Married, Single, 
Divorced, Widowed) 
7. Middle Name 
11. Race, Ethnic, or Tribal Group 
4. U.S. Social Security Number 
(ifany) 
8. Date of Birth 
(mm/dd/yyyy) 
12. Gender 
1 1 Male LJ Female 
13. Is this child in the U.S.? D Yes (Complete blocks 14 to 21.) • No (Specify location.) 
14. Place of last entry into the U.S. 
18. What is your child's current 
status? 
15. Date of last entry into the U.S. 
(mm/dd/yyyy) 
16. 1-94 Number (ifany) 
19. What is the expiration date of his/her authorized 
stay, ifany? (mm/dd/yyyy) 
17. Status when last admitted 
(Visa type, ifany) 
20. Is your child in Immigration Court proceedings? 
• Yes • No 
21. If in the U.S., is this child to be included in this application? (Check the appropriate box.) 
1 1 Yes (Attach one photograph of your child in the upper right corner of Page 9 on the extra copy of the application submitted for this 1
—' person.) 
D No 
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Supplement B, Form 1-589 
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Additionallnlon nation About Your Claim to Asylum JBggWWpi^ 
A-Number (if available) 
Applicant's Name 
Date 
Applicant's Signature 
I^RKi p i 1 
NOTE: Use this as a continuation page for any additional information requested. Copy and complete as needed. 
Part 
Question 
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